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Introduction
Nowadays, microarray technology is available for taking `pictures' of gene ex-
pressions. Within a single experiment of this sophisticated technology, the level
of expression of thousands of genes can be estimated in a sample of cells under a
given condition. This monograph deals with the discussion and the application
of a methodology based on Game Theory for the analysis of gene expression
data. Roughly speaking, the starting point is the observation of a `picture' of
gene expressions in a sample of cells under a biological condition of interest, for
example a tumor. Then, Game Theory plays a primary role to quantitatively
evaluate the relevance of each gene in regulating or provoking the condition of
interest, taking into account the observed relationships in all subgroups of genes.
To fully understand the methodology introduced in this thesis, some pre-
requisites both on Game Theory and on microarray data analysis are required.
In order to create a common background for readers who approach for the ¯rst
time Game Theory or microarray data analysis or both of them, I suggest to
look at Sections 1.1 and 1.2, aimed, respectively, to give a basic introduction to
cooperative Game Theory and to the statistical analysis of microarray expres-
sion data. The contents of those sections are fundamental to understand the
objectives of this thesis, which are described in Section 1.3. Finally, in order
to understand the theory behind the game theoretical model applied to gene
expression data, the preliminary de¯nitions introduced in Section 1.4 and in
Section 1.5 are required.
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1.1 Introduction to Game Theory
Game Theory is a mathematical theory dealing with models for studying inter-
action among decision makers (which are called players). Dealing with decision
makers interaction, the reader should be aware that a decision problem that
involves only one decision maker is not properly in the domain of application of
Game Theory.
Since the seminal book by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (1944)
\Theory of Games and Economic Behavior", it is usual to divide Game Theory
into two main groups of interaction situations (which are called games), non-
cooperative and cooperative games. Non cooperative games deal with con°ict
situations where non binding agreements among the players can be made. In
cooperative games all kinds of agreement among the players are possible.
In non cooperative games, each player will choose to act in his own interest
keeping into account that the outcome of the game depends on the actions of
all the players involved. Actions by players can be simultaneous (for instance
the `stone, paper, scissors' game or the `matching pennies' game) or at several
points in time (for instance the game of chess).
Cooperative games deal with situations where groups of players (which are
called coalitions) coordinate their actions with the objective to end up in joint
pro¯ts which often exceed the sum of individual `pro¯ts'1.
Another important classi¯cation in Game Theory about the goals of the
analysis performed using its tools. A game, both non-cooperative and cooper-
ative, can be analyzed with the objective to indicate what players should do
in the game to maximize their pro¯ts (usually this goal is referred to as the
`normative approach'). Another reason for using Game Theory, is to predict
the outcome of game, i.e. whether or not players optimize their pro¯ts (usually
referred to as the `predictive approach').
In this dissertation I focus on the application of cooperative game theory to
the analysis of gene expression data from microarray experiments. If it is quite
obvious that I do not plan to give advice to genes on how they should behave
inside a biological cell, on the other hand it is not so straightforward to ¯gure
out how to describe the behavior of genes making them to play a certain game,
1For game theorists, utility value would be more correct than the term pro¯t. As for the
ordinary language, I use for the moment the term pro¯t with reference to something that is
in the interest of the decision maker to be maximized.3
and then use it as a tool to predict which genes obtain the maximum pro¯t.
First, it is not obvious at all what is the meaning of `pro¯t' in this context.
In the following sections I will extensively introduce and discuss this topic.
However, the possibility to extend the concept of pro¯ts, bene¯ts, savings or
whatever could be in the interest of each decision maker to be maximized on
her/his own count, is a well known feature of Game Theory applications. In
Game Theory, the term `pro¯t' usually is more correctly replaced by utility
value of a rational player. I do not want to enter here the discussion of how
an utility function is de¯ned and why it is a numerical representation of the
preferences of a rational decision maker. For introductions to this problem see
for instance the books by Kreps (1990) and Osborne and Rubistein (1994).
I will simply note that, sometimes, reasonable considerations bring game
theorists to assume that the players preferences are nicely represented just by
money, and so money will be the pro¯ts to be considered in the game. For
example, one can describe a situations using cooperative games in coalitional
form where the players are willing to join bigger coalitions in order to have extra
monetary bene¯ts or extra monetary savings thanks to the e®ects of coopera-
tion. For instance, consider a cooperative game in coalitional form with three
players, 1, 2 and 3, and with a characteristic function v : P(f1;2;3g) ! f0;1g,
where P(f1;2;3g) is the set of all possible subsets of f1;2;3g, and such that
each coalition with at least two players get 1 euro, and all the remaining coali-
tions get 0 euro (i.e. all the single player coalitions and the empty coalition
get 0). Formally, we are considering the cooperative game in coalitional form
(f1;2;3g;v) such that v(f1;2;3g) = v(f1;2g) = v(f1;3g) = v(f2;3g) = 1 and
v(f1g) = v(f2g) = v(f3g) = v(;) = 0 (for this kind of problems see books by
Owen (1993), Tijs (2003), Young (1995)).
Other times, preferences of players are not addressed to things that have a
monetary counterpart. This is the case, for example, of decisions in a parlia-
ment. Assume that there are three parties, A, B and C, which share the seats
in parliament by 45%, 40%, and 15%. The preferred outcome for a party or a
coalition of parties is intended as the ability to force a decision. In this case, I
will say that the coalition is a winning one. Suppose that decisions are made by
simple majority. No one of single parties will pro¯t from missing the coopera-
tion with others, in the sense that all parties alone are loosing coalitions. On
the contrary, all coalitions with more than one party inside will be a winning4
coalition.
This parliament situation can be properly represented by a cooperative game
in coalitional form, where players are the three parties A, B and C and the
value of each sub-set of players (coalition) is the label of winning or loosing
coalition. Consider 1 as label for winning coalitions, and 0 as label for loosing
coalitions. So, only coalitions with at least two players get 1 and the remaining
coalitions get 0. We are indeed considering the game (fA;B;Cg;w) such that
w(fA;B;Cg) = w(fA;Bg) = w(fA;Cg) = w(fB;Cg) = 1 and w(fAg) =
w(fBg) = w(fCg) = w(;) = 0. Note that this game has precisely the same
structure of the game (f1;2;3g;v) introduced before. In both cooperative games
in coalitional form there are three players (di®erent names, in this case, are not
essential), and in both games only coalitions with at least two players get 1, and
the others get 0.
What is basically changed, making the `same' game suitable for the de-
scription of such completely di®erent situations, is just the de¯nition of the
objectives of each coalition in relation to the preferences of its players. In game
(f1;2;3g;v), it has been assumed that the objective of the players is to maxi-
mize their rewards; in terms of preferences it has been assumed that each player
prefers 1 euro to nothing. In game (fA;B;Cg;w), it has been assumed that
the objective of the players is to force a decision in the parliament, so players
prefer to have the ability to force a decision than not to have it. Concerning
this kind of models, there are many other important aspects that cannot be
taken up in a basic introduction on Game Theory. But I think that these very
preliminary considerations are already su±cient to give a ¯rst insight on the
extreme °exibility of the formal de¯nition of cooperative game in coalitional
form in representing completely di®erent interaction situations.
Now, some words on what it is possible to predict using cooperative games
in coalitional form.
Consider again the example of the parliament. Since the decision rule was the
simple majority it seems not very likely that the distribution of power, however
de¯ned, coincides with the distribution of seats for parties A, B and C. In order
to discuss issues related to the problem of assigning power to the players of
similar cooperative games, and understand how the power distribution changes
when the number of seats or the decision rule change, classical analytical tools
developed in the Game Theory framework are power indices (see for instance5
Felsenthal and Machover (1998) for a formal discussion of the problem; Owen
(1993) for some political applications). The most popular, widely applied to
many political institutions (e.g USA President Elections, ONU Council, EU
Parliament etc.) are the Shapley-Shubik power index (Shapley and Shubik
(1954)) and Banzhaf-Coleman power index (Banzhaf (1965)). Surprisingly, most
power indices are nothing else that well known solution concepts for cooperative
games in coalitional forms. This means that the same method can be used to
allocate among the players the pro¯ts of the big coalition in games where the
value of each coalition represents, for example, monetary rewards.
Which arguments can support the application of the same solution concept
to so di®erent interaction situations and their consequent alternative interpre-
tations?
The answer to this question is rooted in the property driven approach2. If the
quanti¯cation of power is the goal of the analysis, the property driven approach
suggests to postulate discriminating properties which a power measure has to
satisfy in order to qualify as an appropriate measure. If the cooperative game
concerns monetary pro¯ts and the objective is to fairly allocate the total reward
of cooperation, of course the basic properties to be postulated can be di®erent
and their interpretation must be appropriate to the context. On the strength of
the property driven approach, it often happens that a solution concept satis¯es
sound properties in completely di®erent situations (see for instance the volume
by Roth (1988) for di®erent applications of the Shapley value). The strong
connection with the property driven approach is in my opinion one of the main
reasons of success of applied Game Theory, success which is widely manifested by
the several applications of Game Theory to di®erent scienti¯c ¯elds, especially
in Economics, Political Science, Social Science and Evolutionary Biology. Next,
I will try to convince the reader that it can also be successfully applied to gene
expression analysis.
1.2 Introduction to microarray data analysis
Proteins are the structural constituents of cells and tissues and may act as
necessary enzymes for biochemical reactions in biological systems. Most genes
contain the information for making a speci¯c protein. This information is coded
2In Game Theory this approach is also known as the axiomatic method6
in genes by means of the deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). Gene expression occurs
when genetic information contained within DNA is transcripted into messenger
ribonucleic acid (mRNA) molecules and then translated into the proteins.
Nowadays, a revolutionary technique, i.e., the microarray technology, allows
for the collection of huge amount of information concerning the function of
human genes. This approach provides a quantitative measure of gene expression
(the amount of mRNA in a cell sample) for thousands of genes in the same
experiment. The crucial step of this procedure is the hybridization: many DNA
regions immobilized on a small glass, plastic or nylon matrix (probes), bind to
a complementary sequence from the sample under study (sampled mRNA itself
or cDNA obtained by inverse transcription of sampled mRNA), labelled with
°uorescent dyes that °ag their presence when exposed to a speci¯c wavelength
of light. A separate experiment takes place in each of many individual spots
arrayed as a regular pattern on the matrix, whence the name array (Parmigiani
et al. (2003)).
There are several microarray based technologies, which involve di®erent ex-
perimental procedures (see for instance Schena (2003), Parmigiani et al. (2003)).
However, a common objective of gene expression microarrays is to consistently
generate a matrix of expression data, in which the rows (possibly thousands)
index the genes and the columns (usually in the order of units or tens) index the
study samples. Numbers in the matrix represent gene expression ratios which
quantify the relative expression of genes in one target sample with respect to a
given reference sample.
Complex experimental artifacts associated with microarray data collection
have been described, emphasizing the need for statistical treatment of data
during all stages of the experiment. This includes the design of the slide, the
quality assessment, the normalization process (Dudoit et al. (2001); Smith and
Speed (2003), Amaratunga and Cabrera (2004)) and other pre-processing data
analysis (Amaratunga and Cabrera (2004), Parmigiani et al. (2003)) with the
objective of removing systematic variation in microarray experiments. In the
following of this paper I will assume to work on a matrix of gene expression
values that have been already pre-processed.
Many models for data analysis have been presented in the literature for infer-
ring, from a matrix of gene expression data, the role of genes, their interactions
and their behavior when changes in condition of the biological system occur7
(Moler et al. (2000), Su et al. (2003)).
So far, classical statistical techniques used for extracting information from
gene expression microarrays can be classi¯ed in three main groups: inferential
statistical methods used for identifying genes that are regulated by di®erent
conditions of interest, e.g., to ¯nd single genes or groups of genes which show
a statistically signi¯cant di®erence in the expression levels under two or more
conditions of interest (Fujarewicz and Wiench (2003), Storey and Tibshirani
(2003)); unsupervised analysis techniques, used as a method to identify groups
of genes with similar patterns in the expression data (Golub et al. (1999), Alon
et al. (1999)); class prediction tools, where selected genes are used to classify
samples into known categories of morphology, known biological features, clinical
outcomes, or other condition of interests according to gene expression patterns.
It is mostly aimed at supporting early diagnosis in new samples (Dudoit and
Fridlyand (2003), Golub et al. (1999), Dudoit et al. (2002b)).
In order to give a slightly more accurate idea about how these classical
statistical methods have currently been applied to microarray data analysis, I
follow the essential outline of the presentation of the methods in what I consider
one of the most complete books on microarray analysis at the moment, i.e. the
book by Amaratunga and Cabrera (2004).
Concerning the inferential statistical methods, the main task of these meth-
ods is usually accomplished by mean of statistical hypothesis testing. The result
of an hypothesis testing on a gene expression matrix is its decision among two
possible options: to reject the conjecture (null hypothesis) that there is no dif-
ferences in terms of gene expression between two conditions of interest or not
to reject the null hypothesis and declare that there is insu±cient evidence to
detect a di®erence of gene expression between the two conditions. In order to
select or develop a good test for a particular microarray data-set, it is necessary
to make assumptions about that microarray data-set. Di®erent assumptions for
the same situation will generally lead to quite di®erent tests and perhaps even
quite di®erent test results. In general it is important to consider assumptions
carefully, but this is a very di±cult task on microarray analysis where the bio-
logical knowledge that could be used as diagnostics to check the assumptions is
still vague and strongly dependent from the biological conditions of interest.
Unsupervised analysis techniques, also known as pattern discovery or cluster
analysis, has as a main objective to produce evidences for correlated patterns8
of gene expression displayed by genes behaving jointly, such as genes perform-
ing similar functions or genes operating along a genetic pathway. Based on the
quanti¯cations of similarity between observations, most of these methods de-
pend on either a dissimilarity or similarity measure, which quanti¯es how far,
or how close, two observations (for example vectors of gene expressions across
di®erent samples) are from each other. Dissimilarity measures which have been
employed in microarray analysis are classical distances like the Euclidean dis-
tance (Coco et al. (2005)). It is matter of fact that di®erent de¯nitions of
dissimilarity measures bring to di®erent clusters of similar genes. The notion
of similarity or dissimilarity used, however, should re°ect an a priori selected
attribute for joint gene behavior that it is expected to be informative with re-
spect to the biological condition under investigation. So far, it is not clear which
analytical instruments should be used to evaluate the meaning of a given dissim-
ilarity or similarity measure, and the choice of a metric is still almost completely
arbitrary.
Finally, few words on supervised analysis, also called class prediction. To
better understand the main characteristics of this kind of analysis, I found more
explanatory to refer to the biological conditions of interest directly as tumors.
In fact, the tumors are known to be of various di®erent classes and a microarray
gene expression data-set can be extracted from samples collected from di®erent
tumors. Now it is likely that di®erent genes are expressed in the cells of di®erent
tumor classes. Therefore it can be conjectured that it ought to be possible to
di®erentiate among the tumors classes by studying and contrasting their gene
expression pro¯les, that is developing a classi¯cation rule to discriminate them.
The great potential of these methods is that the classi¯cation rule could be ex-
ploited to predict the class of a new tumor sample of unknown class based on its
gene expression pro¯le. Another advantage of these methods is the easy way to
evaluate their performance, as the proportion of misclassi¯cations on the gene
expression matrix where the original tumor class of samples is known (training
set), i.e. the misclassi¯cation rate. On the other hand, from the mathematical
point of view, the biggest problem in the applications of supervised methods to
gene expression data-set is the number of genes much greater than the number
of samples. By retaining such a large number of genes, it is incredibly easy for
supervised methods to ¯nd good-looking but non-reproducible and meaningless
classi¯cation rules, with low misclassi¯cation rate on the training set and very9
high misclassi¯cation rate on the gene expression data where the information
on tumor classes is unknown (test set). From this follows the necessity to ¯nd
a strategy to reduce the number of genes, for example, performing the super-
vised procedure only on those genes which result di®erentially expressed on the
basis of the application of inferential statistical methods. Besides the problems
concerning the assumptions which a®ect the statistical inferential methods as I
mentioned before, this ¯ltering approach encounters also other disadvantages.
Some genes retained could be false positive, and even so produce good perfor-
mance as classi¯ers, performance that of course are not reproducible on other
data-set. Even worst, it may exist a set of genes that together acts as a classi¯er,
but each individual gene in the set does not, making them good candidate for
being ¯ltered out all together. Moreover, many retained genes could show the
same pattern of expression, determining a redundancy in the information.
1.3 Objectives and overview of the thesis
The criterium for the choice of one particular statistical method should be based
on the (justi¯ed) claim that such method is able to select genes covering the
most relevant role in the mechanisms which provoke a biological condition or
response of interest (e.g. a tumor). Unfortunately, the big di±culty in taking
the decision is that classical statistical methods are not directly related with a
biologically sound and operative de¯nition of genes relevance in this context.
Consequently, di®erent sets of genes may be selected depending on the ap-
plication of di®erent statistical methods (Jaeger et al. (2003)). Since usually
there exists a limit on the number of genes to choose, a researcher might not be
able to include all relevant genes in deserving further investigations.
For example, an extremely di±cult question to answer is whether a group
of genes which are individually di®erentially expressed between two di®erent
conditions are more or less relevant in regulating the mechanisms governing
these conditions than another group of genes able to characterize the two con-
ditions only jointly. Di®erently stated, similarly to the considerations done for
the classi¯cation problem, it may exist a set of genes A that together have a
characteristic expression pattern under each condition, but each individual gene
in the set has not. On the contrary, it may exist a set of genes B where each
individual gene is di®erentially expressed under the two conditions. So, the10
problem is: how to make a quantitative comparison of the roles played by the
two respective sets A and B in regulating or provoking the condition of interest?
Another very hard practical problem faced when attempting to use a classical
statistical method in quantifying genes relevance, is that genes relevance index
should take into account the interaction links among genes in the mechanisms
which determine the biological condition of interest. This would imply the
application of the statistical method to each possible subgroup of thousand of
genes, which is often a procedure computationally too costly.
A completely di®erent approach, based on a cooperative game in coalitional
form where the players are genes, has been proposed in this thesis.
In my opinion, the novelty of the approach with respect to the classical
statistical methods is essentially twofold. First, the class of cooperative games
used, called the class of microarray games, provides the e®ective opportunity to
describe the association between the global expression of each coalition of genes
and a biological condition of interest and, as a consequence, to incorporate in the
successive analysis all possible genes interaction ties related with the biological
condition. For example, it is possible to describe the association between the
over-expression or the under-expression properties of genes in each coalition and
the tumor or the e®ect of a treatment in samples.
Even considering all possible subsets of genes, which means increasing a lot
the level of complexity of the analysis, no strong assumptions on the expression
probability distributions have been done. In fact, the characteristic function of
a microarray game relays completely on the observed experimental gene expres-
sion matrix. The very relevant assumption in this context, is the de¯nition of
the causality relation (also called su±ciency principle) which incorporates the
criterium used to establish whether the expression levels of genes in a coalition
are associated or not with the biological condition of interest.
All the information on genes associations stored in the characteristic function
of a microarray game can be successively exploited to quantitatively resume the
role of each gene in each possible coalition by means of the application of solution
concepts for cooperative games. The second novelty of the approach presented in
this thesis is based on this idea of application of solution concepts to microarray
games, and on the strong connection between game theory and the property
driven approach commonly used for studying the properties of solution concepts.
As I pointed out in the general introduction on cooperative game theory, the11
property driven characterization of solution concepts has abundantly been used
in Game Theory, attempting to investigate the real extent of the theory and to
contextualize its potential applications.
Usually, the interpretation of the results obtained by classical statistical pro-
cedures are strongly dependent from the theoretical model used for the analysis
or from strong assumptions about the reference population from which the sam-
ples are collected. The property driven approach o®ers the possibility to over-
turn this view: only weak assumptions on the population are needed and what
is strongly outlined a priori are the boundaries for a plausible interpretations of
the results. In the game theoretical approach, the result is the outcome of a so-
lution concept applied to a microarray game built on a gene expression matrix.
Its interpretation is contextualized ex-ante by means of sound basic properties,
that have to be satis¯ed by a numerical representation of the role played by each
gene in associating the expressions of coalitions with the condition of interest.
This view is particular valuable in the genomic ¯eld, which is still a relatively
young research topic, and the evidences to support strong hypothesis on the
reference populations or the application of sophisticated mathematical models
are still far from to be clear. These considerations are, in my opinion, e®ec-
tively resumed by the following sentence, in StÄ oltzner (2004): if a ¯eld is still
provisional in its basic concepts, and experience with models is fragmentary,
the property driven method is able to act as a controlling instance and steering
device for further exploration.
On the other hand, it is not possible to neglect the fact that gene expression
is a stochastic, or \noisy", process (Elowitz (2002), Swain (2002)). Besides
the biological noise, microarrays data, as any other experimental process, are
subject to random experimental noise. As a consequence, since a microarray
game is inferred from gene expression data, a microarray game itself follows a
stochastic law. Therefore, I felt the necessity to introduce microarray games
in an alternative way, supported by inference arguments, with the objective to
assess the e®ects of the random variability on the observed results of the game
theoretical analysis.
Summing up, the class of microarray games and the methods for their anal-
ysis, constitute the core of this work. Their intrinsic simple structure was the
main reason that convinced me to focus my e®orts on their analysis. On the
other hand, it is possible that some aspects of the real phenomenon that I was12
going to investigate were missed due to the same reason. To catch such aspects,
one possibility could be to make the models a bit more sophisticated, and the
preliminary study on new classes of gene expression based games is the present
direction of my work and the conclusion of my dissertation.
1.3.1 A brief summary of the following chapters
Next sections 1.4 and 1.5 introduce some preliminaries on cooperative games
and on microarray data analysis, respectively.
Chapter 2 is based on Moretti et al. (2004), where the class of microarray
games has been introduced. Via a dichotomization technique applied to gene
expression data, it is constructed a game whose characteristic function takes
values on the interval [0;1]. The objective of such a game is to stress the
relevance (`su±ciency') of groups of genes in relation to a speci¯c biological
condition or response of interest (e.g. a disease of interest). It has been discussed
the possibility of applying game-theoretical tools that can take into account the
relationships which exist among genes, like the Shapley value. The highest
Shapley values of the game should point to the most in°uential genes, so that
it could be useful as a hint for pointing at the genes that mostly deserve further
investigation. A property driven characterization of the Shapley value with a
genetic interpretation is also provided in order to contextualize and justify the
use of the Shapley value as relevance index for genes.
Chapter 3 is based on Moretti (2006). It has been presented a statistical
framework aimed at estimating the accuracy of the observed genes relevance
index and a procedure to test the null hypothesis of no di®erences in terms
of relevance index for genes studied in samples regulated by di®erent biological
conditions. The ¯rst goal of Chapter 3 is to answer the question on how accurate
are the relevance estimates provided by the Shapley value applied on games
introduced in Chapter 2. That question is the prelude for the second subject
of this chapter, i.e. comparing the relevance of genes under di®erent biological
conditions or responses.
Chapter 4 is still in a germinal form and contains many directions on which
I am presently working. In Section 4.1, an alternative model based on minimum
cost spanning tree representation of gene expression data has been introduced.
One of the main characteristics of this model is the possibility to avoid the
dichotomization technique required for microarray games introduced in Chapter13
2. In Section 4.2, the connections between microarray games and the class
prediction problem have been also presented. Finally, in Section 4.3, it has
been introduced an overview of analysis performed on gene expression data of
neuroblastoma samples that is still in progress and that I am doing using the
game theoretical tools presented in the previous chapters.
Finally, note that all the algorithms presented in this dissertation and other
procedures used in the analysis of expression data have been implemented using
the statistical programming language R (R Development Core Team (2004)),
and available on request.
1.4 Preliminary notations on cooperative games
Now, let us introduce some basic game theoretical notations. A cooperative
game with transferable utility or TU-game, also known as coalitional game with
transferable payo®, is a pair (N;v), where N denotes the ¯nite set of players
and v : 2N ! I R the characteristic function, with v(;) = 0. Often we identify
a TU-game (N;v) with the corresponding characteristic function v. A group of
players T µ N is called a coalition and v(T) is called the value of this coalition.
A TU-game (N;w) such that w : 2N ! [0;1] is called a [0;1]-game. We will
denote the class of all [0;1]-games as W, with W ½ G, being G the class of all
TU-games (N;v).
Let C µ G be a subclass of TU-games. Given a set of players N, we denote
by CN µ G the class of TU-games in C with N as set of players.
The unanimity game (N;uR) based on the unanimity set R µ N is the
game described by uR(T) = 1 if R µ T and uR(T) = 0, otherwise. Every
TU-game (N;v) can be written as a linear combination of unanimity games in
a unique way, i.e. v =
P
SµN;S6=; ¸S(v)uS (see for instance Owen (1995)). The
coe±cients (¸S(v))S22Nnf;g are called unanimity coe±cients or dividends of the
game (N;v).
A TU-game (N;v) is monotonic if for all S;T µ N, S µ T implies that
v(S) · v(T).
Let i 2 N. For each S µ N n fig, the quantity mi(v;S) = v(S [ fig) ¡ v(S)
is the marginal contribution of player i to coalition S. A TU-game (N;v) is
convex if for all i 2 N and all S;T µ N n fig, S µ T implies that
mi(v;S) · mi(v;T)): (1.1)14
An allocation (xi)i2N of a TU-game (N;v) is a vector in I RN describing the
payo®s of the players, where player i 2 N receives xi.
An one-point solution for a class C of TU-games is a function Ã that assigns
a payo® vector Ã(v) to every TU-game in the class, that is Ã : CN ! I RN.
The most famous one-point solution in the theory of cooperative games with
transferable utility is the Shapley value, introduced by Shapley (1953). To have
a basic idea about the Shapley value, suppose that all the players are arranged in
some order, all orderings being equally likely. The Shapley value Ái of the game
(N;v) 2 GN, for each i 2 N, is de¯ned as the expected marginal contribution,
over all orderings, of player i to the set of players who precede him. Since for
each S µ N n fig there are precisely
(s¡1)!(n¡s)!
n! orderings in which players in
S precede player i, than the Shapley value Ái applied to game (N;v) 2 GN can




(s ¡ 1)!(n ¡ s)!
n!
mi(v;S)) (1.2)
for each i 2 N, where s = jSj and n = jNj are the cardinality of coalitions S
and N, respectively.
An alternative representation of the Shapley value can be given in terms of







for each i 2 N.
Another one-point solution for cooperative games with transferable utility
is the Banzhaf value, introduced by Banzhaf (1965). The Banzhaf value ¯i(v)






for each i 2 N.
A common characteristics of the Banzhaf value and of the Shapley value of
a game (N;v) is that both one-point solutions belong to the class of allocations





where p(S), for each S 2 2N n f;g, is the probability that a player i 2 S
joins the other players in S n fig to form coalition S. So, ²i(v) is the average
marginal contribution of player i 2 N with respect to all the possible coalitions
in which player i can enter. If p(S) is assumed to be the same for each coalition
S 2 2N n f;g, then p(S) = 1
2n¡1, and the de¯nition of the Banzhaf value by
formula (1.4) is obtained. If p(S) is assumed to be dependent from S, one choice
could be assume that p(S) =
(s¡1)!(n¡s)!
n! , and the de¯nition of the Shapley value
by formula (1.2) is obtained. Of course, other probability distributions on the
set of all coalitions can be used in order to de¯ne di®erent one-point solutions.
Finally, a particular set, possibly empty, of allocations of a TU-game (N;v)
is the core, which is de¯ned as follows:
core(v) = fx 2 I RNj
X
i2S




1.5 Preliminary notations on microarray data
analysis
Let G = f1;2;:::;ng be a set of n genes, SR = f1;2;:::;rg be a set of r
reference samples, i.e. the set of cells from normal tissues and, ¯nally, let SD =
f1;2;:::;dg be the set of d cells from tissues with a biological condition or
response of interest (e.g. a disease).
The goal of a microarray experiment is to associate to each sample j 2
SR [ SD an expression pro¯le (aij)i2G, i.e. aij 2 I R represents the relative ex-
pression value of the gene i in sample j with respect to the reference sample.
Globally, such expression values will be indicated as the data set of the microar-
ray experiment. In the following we will refer to the data set resulting from the
pre-processed method usually called normalization (Dudoit et al.(2001), Smith
and Speed (2003)), which allows for comparison among expression intensities
of genes from di®erent samples. The data set can be expressed in the form
of two expression matrices ASR = (Aj)j2SR and ASD = (Aj)j2SD, where the
index here represents a column, i.e. a sample, where the column Aj is the ex-
pression pro¯le on G of sample j. In summary, we will denote as a microarray
experimental situation (MES) the tuple E =< G;SR;SD;ASR;ASD >.
As the ¯rst step of our analysis, we are interested in understanding whether
genes in each sample in SD are abnormally expressed with respect to the expres-16
sion values showed in SR according to a certain discriminative criterium. For
example, we could refer to the set of abnormally expressed genes in a sample
as the set of over (under) expressed genes in that sample, or the union of over
expressed and under expressed genes in that same sample .
We need to introduce useful notation to deal with abnormally expressed
genes. Note that gene i 2 G which results abnormally expressed on a sample
j 2 SD can be represented setting to 1 the value of a boolean variable bij. We call
abnormal expression pro¯le the vector Bj = (bij)i2G. A discriminant method
can be expressed as a map m assigning to each expression pro¯le from tumor
samples a corresponding abnormal expression pro¯le. Hence, all the information
on the di®erences of gene expression of sample in SD from the ones of sample in
SR can be represented via an abnormal expression matrix BE;m 2 f0;1gG£SD.
Since for our purposes the relevant information is contained in the abnormal
expression matrix BE;m, in the sequel we identify the MES E and the discrimi-
nant method m with the matrix BE;m. Sometimes, unless otherwise clear from
the context, we will also refer to a boolan matrix B 2 f0;1gG£SD as an abnor-
mal expression matrix which has been calculated applying some discriminant
method m to some MES E.
Example 1 Consider an MES E =< G;SD;SR;ASD; ASR > such that ASR is
reported in the following table
sample 1 sample 2 sample 3 sample 4
gene 1 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.6
gene 2 12 10 4 5
gene 3 8 13 20 9
gene 4 0 -0.5 1.4 1.1
and ASD is given in the following one
sample 1 sample 2 sample 3
gene 1 0.9 0.4 0.7
gene 2 4.6 15 18
gene 3 7 21 12
gene 4 0.1 -0.4 1.617
Note that also negative values are possible. This is due to the fact that, usually,
in literature the data set of a microarray experiment is presented in terms of the
logarithm of the relative gene expression ratios, i.e, gene expression in the target
sample = gene expression in the reference sample. Consequently, a positive
number indicates a higher gene expression in the target sample than in the
reference one, whereas a negative number indicates a lower expression in the
target sample.
Now consider a very naive discriminant method m for the two classes 1 and































The class of Microarray
games and the relevance
index for genes
2.1 Introduction
Aim of this chapter is to address the problem of quantifying the relative rel-
evance of genes in a complex scenario - such as the pathogenesis of a genetic
disease - on the basis of the information provided by microarray experiments,
and taking into account the interaction level of each subgroup of genes.
In analyzing gene-gene relationships in microarray data, the main di±culty
is the impossibility to obtain, trough pre-processing data analysis, a total elim-
ination of the technical and biological bias. For this reason, in our approach we
refer to the observed average interaction level of a group of genes, i.e., the aver-
age number of tumor samples in which such a group of genes can be considered
responsible, according to a pre-de¯ned causality principle, for the onset of the
tumor: the higher is the number of samples observed, the lower is the proba-
bility that chance could a®ect the inferences provided by the model. The basic
idea of this model comes from the theory of cooperative games with transferable
utility (TU-games). In particular we considered the framework of simple games,
which have been widely applied to the analysis of the power of players in interac-
1920
tion situations as Councils, Parliament, etc. (Owen (1995), Shapley and Shubik
(1954), Banzhaf (1965)). We adopted the same formal language of TU-game
for modelling the interaction among genes, considered as players, in relation to
the pathogenesis of a genetic disease, e.g., a tumor. The game we considered
origins from the comparison of two matrixes of gene expression data; one from
tumor samples and the other from normal DNA (referent healthy subjects). We
¯rst used a discriminant method on each sample to split the whole set of genes
in two sets, i.e., those genes showing an expression ratio largely di®erent from
normal samples, and those with expression levels corresponding to normal DNA
samples. At this preliminary stage of the model, for each single gene, as in detail
explained in Section 1.5, we used the interval boundaries containing most data
in the normal distribution of that gene as cut-o®s for discrimination (Becquet
et al.(2002)). We then introduced a causality relation (also called su±ciency
principle) which directly determines the characteristic function of the game. An
interpretation of the biological meaning of a relevance index, used for measuring
the \power" of each gene in inducing the tumor, has been given and it turned
out to coincide with the Shapley value of the game considered.
In Section 2.2 the class of microarray games is introduced starting from the
general notion of the su±ciency principle, and some basic properties and exam-
ples of such games are reported. In Section 2.3 an axiomatic characterization
of the Shapley value is given by means of ¯ve properties suitable to genetic
interpretation of this index. Section 2.4 concludes with some considerations on
related works and future research.
2.2 Interaction among genes
In this phase of the analysis we assume that the abnormal expression pro¯le Bj,
for each sample j 2 SD, is a su±cient conditions for the onset of the disease (or
another biological condition or response of interest) in individuals from which
samples in SD are collected (su±ciency principle for groups of genes). Stated
di®erently, a group of genes A µ G which are abnormally expressed in a sample
of SD (according to a discriminant method m applied to the reference expression
matrix ASR) implies that an individual whose sample has at least all (possibly
many more, due to biological and technical bias a®ecting the data set) genes21
in G abnormally expressed (again on the basis of m and ASR) should have the
disease.
One could wonder why a microarray experiment can show -as it usually
happens- di®erent groups of abnormally expressed genes in di®erent tumor sam-
ples.
We attempt to provide an answer to such a question with arguments coming
from di®erent directions.
One is dealing with biology: it is in fact likely that early stages of car-
cinogenesis involve metabolic paths which are controlled by di®erent groups of
genes.
Another reason is technical: a microarray experiment can be a®ected by
many sources of noise (Parmigiani et al.(2003), Smith and Speed (2003)) and this
unwanted variability can a®ect the measurement of expression values. Despite
the reduction of variability in microarray experiments has been the objective of
several works in the last few years, in practice the likely misclassi¯cation of some
genes considered as abnormally expressed cannot be avoided, due to technical
uncertainty.
The arbitrariness of methods used for the discriminant analysis should also
be considered, i.e. the structure of the su±cient groups can be easily biased by
a bad choice of the discriminant method.
The aim of this work is to give an answer to the following questions: how
much relevant for the onset of a tumor are the genes which are abnormally
expressed inside the sample SD? Is it possible to provide a measure of the
power of genes in determining the onset of the tumor in an individual, on the
basis of the information collected via samples SD and SR and the discriminant
method m used?
Consider for instance a MES ¹ E =< G;SD;SR;ASD;ASR > and a discrimi-
















On the basis of matrix (2.1) it seems very reasonable to a±rm that on the
basis of the information collected ASR and the discriminant method used m,22
all the genes abnormally expressed have the same power in causing the tumor,
assuming the principle of su±ciency for groups of abnormally expressed genes
introduced before.
On the other hand, it could be reasonable to expect experimental situations
where there are many abnormal expression pro¯les inside the sample SD, like
in the abnormal expression matrix of Example 1 and Example 2.
Example 2 Consider again the MES E of Example 1 and a more conservative













The resulting abnormal expression matrix is the following
















i are the 25th and the 75th percentiles of the expression
distribution of gene i (i.e. the ith row) in the reference expression matrix ASR,
for each i 2 G.
How to deal with these situations?
Given an MES E =< G;SD;SR;ASD;ASR > and a discriminant method m,
¯rst we determined the average number of individuals with the tumor due to
the abnormal expression of a given group of genes. Of course we calculated such
average values on the basis of the information provided by the pair < E;m >,
that is, for each group A µ G, we looked at the number of groups of abnormal
expressed genes in BE;m that are included in A. We formalize such a concept
via the following de¯nitions (in the following BE;m(j) will be the column j,
j 2 f1;:::;jSDjg, of the abnormal expression matrix BE;m).
De¯nition 1 Let v 2 f0;1gn, n 2 f1;2;:::g. We de¯ne the support of v
denoted by sp(v) the set
sp(v) = fi 2 f1;:::;ng j vi = 1g:23
Example 3 Consider the abnormal expression matrix BE;m of Example 1.
Then sp(BE;m(1)) = f1;3g, sp(BE;m(2)) = f2;3g and sp(BE;m(3)) = f1;2;4g.
De¯nition 2 Let E =< G;SD;SR;ASD;ASR > be an MES and let m be a
discriminant method. We de¯ne the average number of individuals with tumor





where j£(T)j is the cardinality of the set
£(T) = fk 2 f1;:::;jSDjg j sp(BE;m(k)) µ T; sp(BE;m(k)) 6= ;g (2.3)
and v(;) = 0.
Now, the de¯nition of the corresponding TU-game should be clear:
² the set of players is the set of genes G;
² the characteristic function is the average number of individuals with tumor
determined by the genes T, for each T 2 2G n f;g.
More formally
De¯nition 3 Let E =< G;SD;SR;ASD;ASR > be an MES and let m be a
discriminant method. We de¯ne the corresponding microarray game as the TU-
game (G;v), where v is de¯ned as in De¯nition 2.
Remark 1 Condition sp(BE;m(k) in relation (2.3) is due to practical consid-
erations concerning the interpretation of the su±ciency principle for groups of
genes on samples where genes do not show any abnormal expression properties.
We are assuming that the contribution of such a sample in increasing the level
of association between the abnormal expression of genes in S and the disease
(or another condition of interest) is null, for each coalition S µ N.
The class of microarray games will be denoted with the symbol M. Let E =<
G;SD;SR;ASD;ASR > be an MES and let m be a discriminant method. Ac-
cording to equality (2.2), an equivalent way to calculate the corresponding mi-







where usp(BE;m(j)) is the unanimity game on sp(BE;m(j)) µ G, for each j 2
f1;:::;jSDjg.
Alternatively, it is possible to rewrite equation (2.4) in terms of the unanimity
coe±cients of a microarray game v. Let ¹ ¸S 2 f0;1;2;:::g be the number of








where ¹ ¸S = jfk 2 f1;:::;jSDjg s.t. sp(BE;m(k)) = S; sp(BE;m(k)) = ;gj.
Example 4 Consider again the abnormal expression matrix BE;m of Example






uf1;3g + uf2;3g + uf1;2;4g
¢
:
It follows that v(;) = v(f1g) = v(f2g) = v(f3g) = v(f4g) = v(f1;2g) =
v(f1;4g) = v(f2;4g) = v(f3;4g) = 0; v(f1;3g) = v(f2;3g) = v(f1;3;4g) =
v(f2;3;4g) = v(f1;2;4g) = 1
3; v(f1;2;3g) = 2
3, v(f1;2;3;4g) = 1.
It is easy to check that microarray games are [0;1]-games.
At this point, the major fundamental question addressed by our work can be
formulated in the following terms: is it possible to employ the standard theory
of TU-games to measure the expected relevance of each gene in determining the
onset of tumor on the basis of the microarray experimental situation and the
discriminant method used?
For instance, we can calculate the Shapley value of a microarray game. In the
last ¯fty years, many studies have addressed the goal of evaluating the power
of players (e.g. members of councils, voters in an electoral systems, parties
in a parliament etc.) (see for instance Owen (1995)), which are TU-games
whose characteristic function can only assume values 1 (for winning coalitions,
i.e. coalitions which are able to force the endorsement of a motion) or 0 (for
loosing coalitions). In such contexts, the idea was to evaluate the amount of
power of players according to the role covered by each of them in supporting
the goal of each possible coalition. There, the Shapley value (Shapley (1953),
Shapley and Shubik (1954)), as well as many other solutions for TU-games,
have been interpreted as power index for players (Shapley and Shubik (1954),
Banzhaf (1965)).25
On the other hand, even if the Shapley value has been proved to be very
meaningful in political applications, it cannot be taken for granted the same
signi¯cance in the microarray context.
The next examples show the behavior of the Shapley value on some particular
instances of microarray.





9). This means that on the basis of the corresponding MES E and the
discriminant method m the Shapley value of the microarray game states that
the most important attribute in determining the tumor onset - on the average
- is gene 3, followed by genes 1 and 2 with the same score and gene 4.
Example 6 The Shapley value of the microarray game corresponding to the




9). On the basis of the
considerations detailed in Example 5, we obtain that the most important gene
in determining the tumor onset, on the average, is gene 2, followed by gene 1, 3
and 4 with the same score.
Example 7 Consider again the abnormal expression matrix (2.1). The Shapley
value of the corresponding microarray game is (1
2;0; 1
2;0).
Example 8 We introduce here a preliminary application of our model on a
real MES Ec =< G;SD;SR;ASD;ASR > where ASD and ASR represent the
tumor/normal data set (freely obtainable on the web site1) containing expres-
sion levels of a set G of 2000 genes measured using A®ymatrix oligonucleotide
microarrays for a set SD of 40 tumor samples and a set SR of 22 normal samples
of colon tissues. After the preprocessing stage performed by the Bioconductor
speci¯c software for microarray analysis (Gentleman et al.(2004)), we applied
the discriminant method m introduced in Example 1 in order to provide the
abnormal expression matrix BEc;m, which ¯nally produces the corresponding
microarray game (G;vc).
In the following Table, the ¯rst ten genes with highest Shapley value 2 on
the microarray game (G;vc) have been indicated.
1http://microarray.princeton.edu/oncology/a®ydata/index.html
2We computed the Shapley value of the microarray game (G;vc) by means of the procedure
suggested by equation (1.3), implemented in the programming language R (R Development
Core Team (2004)). Also the discriminant methods and other procedures for the manage-
ment of data sets used in this application have been implemented using the language and
environment R.26
Gene Gene Name Shapley
Number £(10¡3)
Z50753 H.sapiens mRNA for GCAP-II/ 3.83
uroguanylin precursor
H17434 NUCLEOLIN (HUMAN) 3.56
H06524 GELSOLIN PRECURSOR, PLASMA (HUMAN) 3.34
H72234 DNA-(APURINIC OR APYRIMIDINIC SITE) 3.33
LYASE (HUMAN)
M36634 Human vasoactive intestinal peptide (VIP) 3.23
mRNA, complete cds.
U06698 Human neuronal kinesin heavy chain mRNA, 3.21
complete cds.
H61410 PLATELET GLYCOPROTEIN IV (H. sapiens) 3.14
R39209 HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS TYPE I 3.13
ENHANCER-BINDING PROTEIN 2 (H. sapiens)
M58050 Human membrane cofactor protein (MCP) 3.09
mRNA, complete cds.
H08393 COLLAGEN ALPHA 2(XI) CHAIN (H. sapiens) 3.01
The complete distribution of the Shapley value on the genes is depicted in
Figure 1.
Some of the genes selected were previously observed to be associated with the
colon cancer (Fujarewick and Wiench (2003)): the vasoactive intestinal peptide
(VIP), has been suggested to promote the growth and proliferation of tumor
cells; the membrane cofactor protein (MCP) represents a possible mechanism
of the ability of the tumor to evade destruction by the immune system (tumor
escape); gelsolin is protein which acts as both a regulator and an e®ector of
apoptosis, i.e. the mechanism responsible for the physiological deletion of cells.
DNA-apurinic or apyrimidinic site lyase protein plays an important role in DNA
repair and in resistance of cancer cells to radiotherapy (Moler et al.(2000)).
For comparison, we computed on the corresponding microarray game also
another very famous solution: the Banzhaf value (Banzhaf (1965)). The com-
mon genes in the top ten of Shapley value and Banzhaf value have been indicated
in bold.27
Figure 2.1: Shapley value of genes in a real MES.
The previous examples show a reasonable behavior of the Shapley value in
measuring the relevance of each gene in determining the tumor onset. Further-
more, to support the idea that the Shapley value is a good estimator of the
relevance of each gene, in the next section we provide a new axiomatic charac-
terization of this solution satisfying properties which have a nice interpretation
in the gene scenario.
We end this section with some properties of microarray games.
Proposition 1 Let < G;SD;SR;ASD;ASR > and m be an MES and a dis-
criminant method, respectively, and let v be the corresponding microarray game
in MG. Then v is a super-additive, monotone and convex TU-game.
Proof Super-additivity and monotonicity follow directly from the fact that
unanimity games are super-additive and monotone and by equation (2.5) mi-
croarray games are positive linear combination of unanimity games.
It is easy to check that Convexity follows analogously from convexity of
unanimity games. First, note that for an unanimity game uS, S µ N, the
marginal contribution uS(T) ¡ uS(T n fig) can be 0 or 1, for each i 2 N and
each T 2 2N n f;g such that i 2 T. If i 2 N n S, then uS(T) ¡ uS(T n fig) = 0.
On the other hand, by de¯nition of unanimity game, if i 2 S then the following28
statement:
uS(T) ¡ uS(T n fig) = 1 ) uS(R) ¡ uS(R n fig) = 1
holds for each R;T such that T µ R µ N and i 2 T. Hence, it remains to prove
equation (1.1) on game uS.
Again, convexity of v follows immediately by equation 2.5, since for each
T µ R µ N n fig and each i 2 N
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uV (R [ fig) ¡ uV (R)
¢
=
v(R [ fig) ¡ v(R);
where ¹ ¸S = jfk 2 f1;:::;jSDjg s.t. sp(BE;m(k)) = Sgj.
2.3 An axiomatic characterization of the Shap-
ley value with genetic interpretation
In order to characterize the Shapley value by means of properties with genetic
interpretation, the de¯nition of partnership of genes takes a basic role.
De¯nition 4 Let v 2 MN. A coalition S 2 2N n f;g such that for each T ( S
and each R µ N n S
v(R [ T) = v(R)
is a partnership of genes in the microarray game v.
The worth v(S) of a partnership of genes S represents the maximum average
number of onsets of the tumor that genes in the partnership are able to deter-
mine in the population, whatever the interaction of its genes with the others
outside the partnership may be. Note that the concept of partnership in TU-
games has been introduced in Kalai and Samet (1988) in a general context not
involving genes.29
Remark 2 Let v 2 MN and let S 2 2N nf;g be a partnership in v. Then it is
trivial to prove that each T µ S is a partnership itself.
Let v 2 MN. A maximal partnership S 2 2N n f;g in v is a maximal subset of
N with the property to be a partnership in v.
We denote by P(v) the set of all the maximal partnerships in v. Note that, by
De¯nition 4, it immediately follows that all one player coalitions are partnerships
in v. One easily obtains that the collection of maximal partnerships in v forms a
partition of N. For instance, in the microarray game (f1;2;3;4g;v) of Example
4 P(v) = ff1g;f2g;f3g; f4gg and coincides with set of all the partnerships in
v; whereas in the microarray game of Example 7 P(v) = ff1;3g;f2;4gg.
Some interesting properties for solutions of microarray games, which are
related to the concept of partnership of genes, are the following.
Let F : MN ! I RN be a solution on the class of microarray games.





for each S 2 2N n f;g such that S is a partnership of genes in the game v.
The PR properties determines a lower bound of the power of a partnership,
i.e. the total relevance of a partnership of genes in determining the onset of the
tumor in the individuals should not be lower than the average number of cases
of tumor enforced by the partnership itself.





for each S 2 2N n f;g such that S is a partnership of genes in the game v.
On the contrary of PR, the PF properties determines an upper bound of
the power of a partnerships, i.e. the total relevance of a partnership of genes
in determining the tumor onset in the individuals should not be greater than
the average number of cases of tumor enforced by the grand coalition, which is
always 1.30
Property 3 Let v 2 MN. The solution F has the Partnership Monotonicity
(PM) property, if
Fi(v) ¸ Fj(v)
for each i 2 S and each j 2 T, where S;T 2 2N n f;g are partnerships of genes
in v such that S \ T = ;, v(S) = v(T), v(S [ T) = v(N), jSj · jTj.
The PM property is very intuitive: consider two disjoint partnerships of
genes enforcing the same average number of cases of tumor in the set of samples.
If the genes outside the union of those two partnerships are irrelevant - that is
they do not contribute in increasing the average number of tumors - then genes
in the smaller partnership should receive a higher relevance index than genes in
the bigger one.
The next two properties do not involve the concept of partnership of genes.


















r are r abnormal expression matrix with the




r coincides with the microarray game corresponding to the ab-




To prove these facts a cumbersome notation is needed. So, we prove it in
detail only for r = 2.
Let k;l;p 2 N and let © : I Rk£l £ I Rk£p ! I Rk£(l+p) be a matrix operator
such that if A 2 I Rk£l and B 2 I Rk£p, then A © B = C is such that Ci = Ai
for each i 2 f1;:::;lg and Cj+l = Bj for each j 2 f1;:::;ng.
Let AEA;m 2 f0;1gk£l and BEB;m 2 f0;1gk£p be two abnormal expression
matrix arising from the application of a given discriminant method m on two
di®erent microarray experimental situations on the same set of genes G and the
same set of reference samples SR, with jGj = k, and where l and p are the cardi-
nality of the respective sets of tumor samples. Consider vA;vB 2 MN the two
3Assuming the continuity of F, it can be proved, using functional equation theory, that
the ES property is equivalent to the simpler property of requiring that F satis¯es F( v+w
2 ) =
F(v)+F(w)
2 for each pair v;w 2 MN.31
corresponding microarray games, respectively obtained from AEA;m and BEB;m
by De¯nition 3. It is easy to check that the game vA+vB
2 is the microarray game





Therefore, if l = p, the microarray game vA+vB
2 corresponds to AEA;m©BEB;m.
For r > 2 similar arguments hold too.
The ES property underlies a principle of equivalence of reliability levels
for microarray games arising from equal splitting of the same MES. Let <
G;SD;SR;ASD;ASR > be an MES and let SD1;:::;SDm form a partition of the
set of samples SD such that jSD1j = jSD2j = ¢¢¢ = jSDmj. If the ES property
holds, then the relevance index computed on the microarray game correspond-
ing to < G;SD;SR;A;ASD;ASR > equals the average of the relevant indices
computed on the microarray games arising from the microarray experimental
situations < G;SD1;SR;ASD1;ASR >, :::; < G;SDm;SR;ASDm;ASR >, re-
spectively; di®erently stated, the relevance index is independent from the equal
splitting partition fSD1;:::;SDmg chosen.
The last property involves the de¯nition of null player of a game (N;v), that
is a player i 2 N such that v(S [ i) = v(S) for each S µ N n fig.
Property 5 Let v;w 2 MN. The solution F has the Null Player (NP) prop-
erty, if for each null player i 2 N
Fi(v) = 0:
The interpretation of the NP property is straightforward: if a player does
not contribute anything to each coalition S 2 2N then he gets null relevance.
Remark 4 It is well known in literature that the Shapley value satis¯es the
NP property on each class of TU-games CN µ GN. The ES property directly
follows from Remark 3 together with additivity and homogeneity of the Shapley
value Á on GN, that is Á(®v + ¯w) = ®Á(v) + ¯Á(w) for each v;w 2 GN.
Lemma 1 Let v 2 MN and let S 2 2N n f;g be a maximal partnership in v.
Then the Shapley value attributes the same relevance index to players in S.32
Proof Let Á(v) be the Shapley value on the game v. For each U µ N such
that i 2 U the marginal contribution of player i 2 S is the following
v(U) ¡ v(U n fig)





v(U n S) ¡ v(U n S) if U \ S 6= S





0 if U \ S 6= S
v(U) ¡ v(U n S) if U \ S = S;
where the second equality follows by De¯nition 4 on partnership S.
Then, the marginal contribution of each player i 2 S to coalition U is dif-
ferent from zero only if S is a subset of U, which means that by equation (1.2)









n! (v(U) ¡ v(U n S));
for each i 2 S, proving that the Shapley value is the same for each player i 2 S.
Lemma 2 Let v 2 MN and let S 2 2N n f;g be a maximal partnership in v.
Then
v(U) = 0
for each U ( S.
Proof Suppose on the contrary v(U) 6= 0. Then, by De¯nition 3, v(R [ U) >
v(R) for each R µ N n U, which yields a contradiction by De¯nition 4.
Proposition 2 The Shapley value satis¯es the properties PM, PR, PF.
Proof Let v 2 MN and let Á(v) be the Shapley value on the game v.33
i) Let S and T two disjoint partnerships such that v(S) = v(T) and v(S [
T) = v(N).
If S and T are subsets of the same maximal partnership, then their Shapley
index is the same by Lemma 1, and PM is directly satis¯ed.
If S and T are subsets of two di®erent maximal partnerships U and V ,
respectively, then S = U and T = V . In fact, suppose on the contrary
that S ½ U or T ½ V . By condition v(S) = v(T) and Lemma 2 we have
v(S) = v(T) = 0, and then, by de¯nition 3, it follows v(S [ T) 6= v(N),
which yields a contradiction.
We still have to prove PM when S and T are two maximal partnerships.
By condition v(S [ T) = v(N) and De¯nition 3, it turns out that v(U) =
v(U \ (S [ T)) for each U µ N. By Lemma 2 and De¯nition 4 v(R) = 0
for each R µ S[T, with S;T * R. Hence, it is possible to write the game





v(S)(uT + uS) + v(N)uS[T
¢
;
where SD is the number of samples in the corresponding MES. Finally, by









each j 2 T, which concludes the proof of the PM property of the Shapley
value.
ii) The convexity of microarray games by Proposition 1 guarantees that the
Shapley value Á(v) is in the core of the microarray game v. The PR
property follows directly from intermediate rationality of core allocations.
iii) For each S 2 2N n f;g such that S is a maximal partnership in v, by
monotonicity of v and the fact that Á(v) is in the core of the microarray
game v we have
P
i2S Ái(v) ¸ v(S) ¸ 0. On the other hand, by e±ciency
of the Shapley value,
P
i2N Ái(v) = v(N) and then
P
i2S Ái(v) · v(N),
which proves that the Shapley value satis¯es the PF property.
Theorem 1 Let be given a ¯nite set N. The Shapley value on the class MN
of microarray games is the unique relevance index which satis¯es the properties
PR, PF, PM, ES and NP.34
Proof We already know by Proposition 2 and Remark 4 that the Shapley value
satis¯es the ¯ve properties PR, PF, PM, ES and NP. To prove the uniqueness
consider a map Ã : MN ! I RN satisfying PR, PF, PM, ES and NP.
Consider the unanimity game (N;uS) 2 MN, where S 2 2N n f;g. First
note that players j 2 N n S are null players. Then by NP property, Ãj(uS) = 0
for each j 2 N n S.
Moreover, it is easy to see that S is a maximal partnership in uS. Then by
Lemma 2, for each pair of nonempty sets U;W µ S such that U \ W = ; and
U [W = S, uS(U) = uS(W) = 0 and uS(U [W) = uS(S) = uS(N). Since PM
property holds for Ã, then Ãi(uS) = Ãj(uS) for each i;j 2 S.
It follows that
P
i2S Ãi(uS) = jSjÃk(uS), with k 2 S. By PR jSjÃk(uS) ¸ 1
and, by PF jSjÃk(uS) · 1. Hence, Ãk(uS) = 1
jSj for each k 2 S and Ãk(uS) = 0





















where ¹ ¸S = jfk 2 f1;:::;jSDjg : sp(BE;m(k)) = Sgj, SD is the set of sam-
ples of an MES corresponding to v (note that
P
SµN:S6=; ¹ ¸S = jSDj), the ¯rst
equality follows by equation (2.5) and the second one by the ES property,.
According to equation (1.3), it has been proved that Ã(v) = Á(v), where
Á(v) is precisely the Shapley value on the microarray game v.
2.4 Discussion
In this chapter we introduced an application of cooperative TU-games to gene
expression analysis related with disease onset. An axiomatic characterization
of the Shapley value aimed at identifying a relevance index for genes has been
also presented.
As far as we know, cooperative game theory has been previously used in gene
analysis in a recent work by Kaufman et al.(2004) as an application of the Multi-
perturbation Shapley value Analysis (MSA) (Keinan et al.(2004)). The aim of35
that work was to identify the importance in terms of causal responsibility of some
genes in performing a certain function in yeast cells. In their approach, Kaufman
et al.(2004) evaluate the worth of each coalition as a measure of the biological
system's performance for a certain function (e.g. the ability of the system to
survive the UV irradiation). In order to obtain such a worth for each coalition,
they carried out a series of experiments where genes of each di®erent subset
of n genes were perturbed concomitantly; on each experiment the performance
score was also measured and the score assigned to the corresponding subset of
perturbed genes, ¯nally obtaining a TU-game. For 2n experiments were needed
to obtain a TU-game, implying the impossibility to deal with the complete
structure of the game, both for practical and computational reasons, authors
suggested two complementary approaches: a) the use of mathematical predictors
on the available data set to predict the missing performance scores (Doudoit
and Fridlyand (2003), Golub et al.(1999)); b) limiting the focus to one and two
dimensional interactions (Grabish and Roubens (1999), Keinan et al.(2004)).
In our application setting, where samples of tumoral individuals are involved,
of course we cannot imagine to perform such perturbation experiments. More-
over, from the computational point of view, the procedure to obtain the Shapley
value of a microarray game is very simple to be implemented. On the other hand,
the interpretation of the Shapley value as a measure of the functional causal con-
tribution of genes in a biological system, as provided by Kaufman et al.(2004)
seems to corroborate our interpretation of the Shapley value as indicator of the
relevance of genes in tumor onset.
Finally, note that an axiomatic characterization of the Shapley value with
the axioms PR, PF, PM, NP, together with the additivity property (see for
instance Shapley (1953)) holds on the more general class of TU-games which
are a positive linear combination of unanimity games.36Chapter 3




In Chapter 2, a game theoretical approach, based on a cooperative game in coali-
tional form with the set of genes as set of players, has been used to describe the
strength of each subgroup (coalition) of genes in provoking a condition of inter-
ests and, as a consequence, to incorporate in the successive analysis all possible
genes interaction links related with the condition. On the class of microarray
games, an operative de¯nition of relevance index for genes has been provided
in terms of the well known Shapley value (Shapley (1954)) and the biological
justi¯cation of its use has been circumstantiated via a new axiomatic charac-
terization. Since gene expression is a stochastic, or \noisy", process (Elowitz
(2002), Swain (2002)) and a microarray game is de¯ned on a gene expression
data-set, a microarray game itself follows a stochastic law. For this reason, given
an expression data-set of genes under a condition of interest, in Chapter 2 the
estimates of genes relevance in provoking the condition have been attained by
the Shapley value of the corresponding microarray game, which is de¯ned as
the average game across all the observed single sample based games.
3738
The ¯rst goal of this chapter is to answer the question on how accurate are
the relevance estimates provided in Chapter 2. That question is the prelude
for the second subject of this work, i.e. comparing the relevance of genes under
di®erent biological conditions or responses, for instance two di®erent sub-types
of tumors, or two di®erent treatments etc. In practice, we present an algorithm
to perform statistical inference based on the sampling distributions of the sample
statistic of microarray games and the corresponding statistic of Shapley values.
Section 3.3 describes how to estimate, from the information provided by
a microarray experiment, the average game in the population of cells/samples
under the same biological condition. Section 3.4 introduce the Shapley value
distribution on the population of cells under the same biological condition, and
shows that a good estimate of the average Shapley value in the population of
cells is the Shapley value of a microarray game.
Section 3.3 and 3.4 together introduce the statistical framework to set up the
bootstrap based algorithm presented in Section 3.5. The basic idea of Bootstrap
(Efron (1979); see also Efron and Gong (1983) Efron and Tibshirani (1993)) is
to use re-sample techniques to collect information about the shape, center, and
spread of the sampling distribution of the statistic of interest. This idea is par-
ticularly valuable when it is not possible to assume a given model describing
the gene expression distributions in the population and, consequently, it is not
possible to calculate the parameter of the corresponding sampling distribution.
This is the case of many microarray experiments where gene expression distribu-
tions present high heterogeneity (see for example Grant et al. (2002) concerning
the Golub et al. (1999) leukemia data set). The problem is even more com-
plex dealing with transformations of the gene expression distributions, as in
the present study, where the statistics of microarray games must be considered.
The problem of simultaneous comparison of thousands of null hypothesis is also
tackled in Section 3.5.
Section 3.6 is dedicated to the application of the bootstrap based method
presented in Section 3.5 to the analysis of the well studied 38 leukemia sam-
ples data-set published by Golub et al. (1999). Section 3.7 concludes the work
with some remarks on genes found signi¯cant from the application described in
Section 3.6.39
3.2 Preliminary notations
To help the reader in following the argumentations of this chapter, we collect
here the required basic de¯nitions introduced in Chapter 2. Let v 2 f0;1gn,
n 2 f1;2;:::g. We de¯ne the support of v denoted by sp(v) the set
sp(v) = fi 2 f1;:::;ng j vi = 1g:
Let B 2 f0;1gn£k, n;k 2 f1;2;:::g, be a boolean matrix. We de¯ne the
microarray game corresponding to B as the TU-game (N; ¹ v) such that N =
f1;:::;ng and ¹ v : 2N ! I R+ is such that for each T 2 2N n f;g, ¹ v(T) is the
number of occurrences of the coalition T as a superset of the supports in the





where j£(T)j is the cardinality of the set
£(T) = fj 2 f1;:::;kg j sp(Bj) µ T; sp(Bj) = ;g







for each S 2 2N n;, where (N;usp(Bj)) is the unanimity game on the set sp(Bj).
The class of microarray games will be denoted with the symbol M.
Example 9 Consider the boolean matrix B 2 f0;1g4£3 such that
B =
0







C C C C
A
:
Then sp(B(1)) = f1;3g, sp(B(2)) = f2;3g and sp(B(3)) = f1;2;4g. By equa-





uf1;3g + uf2;3g + uf1;2;4g
¢
:
It follows that v(;) = v(f1g) = v(f2g) = v(f3g) = v(f4g) = v(f1;4g) =
v(f2;4g) = v(f1;2g) = v(f3;4g) = 0; v(f1;3g) = v(f2;3g) = v(f1;3;4g) =
v(f2;3;4g) = v(f1;2;4g) = 1
3; v(f1;2;3g) = 2
3, v(f1;2;3;4g) = 1.





Let k be the number of cells/arrays. After the application of speci¯c proce-
dure aimed to remove bias and to normalize gene expressions, the data set which
results from a microarray experiment consists of an expression value matrix of
n rows (genes) and k columns (cells / biological samples). Once that the appli-
cation of the discriminant method used to establish whether a gene i shows the
expression property a or not in sample j is performed, for each j 2 f1;:::;kg
and i 2 f1;:::;ng, the original data set is transformed in a data set that can be
represented by means of an abnormal boolean matrix B 2 f0;1gn£k, where the
Bij = 1 if gene i in the sample j shows the expression property a, and Bij = 0
otherwise, for each i 2 f1;:::;ng and j 2 f1;:::;kg.
3.3 Microarray game as estimation of gene as-
sociations
Let N be a set of genes. The goal of this section and of the next one is twofold:
¯rst we want to show how the game theoretical terminology is well suited to
describe the variability of genes properties across di®erent biological conditions
(e.g. normal or tumoral tissues, under pathogenetically distinct tumor types,
under di®erent treatment etc.) in the population of original cells; second, we
want to introduce the probabilistic background that we need to justify the ap-
plication of inferential methods on the statistics provided as the results of the
game theoretical analysis. We are interested in building a TU-game (N;v) where
the characteristic function v assigns to each coalitions S µ N the frequency of
associations of a given biological condition with a given expression property of
genes realized in the coalition S. Di®erent expression properties for genes might
be considered like, e.g., over-expression, up or down regulation, strong variation
etc.
A key issue for the de¯nition of such game (N;v) is an operational de¯ni-
tion of what we mean for associations between a gene expression property and
a biological condition realized in a coalition S 2 2N n f;g. In Chapter 2 we
introduced an operational de¯nition to ¯nd associations, claiming that a suf-
¯cient conditions to realize in a coalition S µ N the association between an
expression property and a biological condition of the original cell is that all the
genes which present such expression property in the cell belongs to the coalition
S (su±ciency principle for groups of genes). Said di®erently, a group of genes41
S µ N which contains all the genes showing the expression property coded by
a (e.g. abnormal expression) under the biological condition of the original cell
coded by t (e.g. tumoral cell) is said to realize the association between a and t.
We will call the coalitions which realize the association between the expression
property and the biological condition of the original cell a winning coalition.
Note that if m · n is the number of genes showing the expression property a,
the number of winning coalitions is 2n¡m.
Things would be much easier if the set of winning coalitions of two cells un-
der the same biological condition would be always the same. On the contrary, a
di®erence in terms of expression properties of genes across cells under the same
biological condition is usual, mainly due to individual, environmental and tem-
poral variability. Moreover, all the quantitative methods used to establish the
expression property of genes in a cell introduce some bias which a®ects the deci-
sion process of gene expression attributions. Further, the high complex network
of regulative relations among genes potentially involved in a biological situation
could amplify each single source of error thousands of times. Last but not least,
the gene expression amount is a continuous variable which hypothetically could
assume whatever value across di®erent individuals, then it is not at all easy to
identify good criteria to discriminate between di®erent expression property (in
Appendix we propose a discretization technique for this purpose).
In order to tackle this problem, we assign to each coalition S 2 2N nf;g the
expected frequency of cells in the population in which such a coalition S is a
winning coalition, in formula
v(S) = ¹ FS; (3.3)
where ¹ FS is the expectation of F S, i.e. the probability distribution on the set
f0;1g, where 1 means that S is a winning coalition and 0 means that S is not.
Note that according to the su±ciency principle and Remark 1, the probability
distribution F S can be calculated as follows
FS(1) = I P(fi 2 SjGi = 0g 6= S)I P(fi 2 N n SjGi = 1g = ;) (3.4)
where Gi, i 2 f1;:::;ng, are n (possibly dependent) random variables on the
set f0;1g, where 1 means that gene i shows the expression property a and 0
means that the gene i does not show the expression property a; consequently,
I P(fi 2 SjGi = 0g 6= S) is the probability that at least one gene i 2 S shows
the expression property under consideration and I P(fi 2 N n SjGi = 1g = ;) is42
the probability that no genes in N n S show the same expression property.
Let k be the number of samples/arrays and n be the number of genes. Con-
sider an abnormal boolean matrix B 2 f0;1gn£k. For each S 2 2N n f;g it is
possible to check whether S contains the support sp(Bj), for each j 2 f1;:::;kg;
so, via matrix B we actually face 2N ¡ 1 random samples of size k (we de¯ne
a random sample of size k as a family of k independent and equally distributed





k » F S; (3.5)







k for each S 2 2Nnf;g, with xS
j 2 f0;1g







use as an estimate of the expectation of F S. Then, we can de¯ne the TU-game
(N; ¹ v) where for each S 2 2N n f;g







and ¹ v(;) = 0.
Comparing relations (3.2) and (3.6), it is easy to check that (N; ¹ v) is the
microarray game corresponding to the boolean matrix B as de¯ned in (3.1).






k provides also an











^ ¾S is the estimated standard error of ¹ XS = ¹ xS = ¹ v(S), the mean squared root
of estimation.
Example 10 Consider the expression matrix presented in Table 3.1. Suppose
we are interested in encoding each gene i 2 f1;:::;8g in each cell/biological
sample j, for each j 2 f1;:::;7g according to a gene expression property. Dif-
ferent discretization operators that, given user de¯ned parameters, can be used to
transform each numerical value from continuous gene expression data into one
boolean value per gene expression property, deciding whether the true or the false
value must be assigned to gene i in cell/biological sample j with respect to the ex-
pression property under consideration (Pensa et al. (2004)). Table 3.2 shows a43
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
gene 1 9 0 -1 -3 0 0 8
gene 2 0 -1 -1 7 0 14 -1
gene 3 -1 -1 -2 4 6 10 13
gene 4 -1 0 0 -1 8 14 0
gene 5 1 0 5 10 0 1 -1
gene 6 0 -1 0 -2 13 8 0
gene 7 -1 14 0 7 1 -1 0
gene 8 0 0 -1 -2 0 8 13
Table 3.1: A toy example of microarray expression matrix with n = 8 genes and
k = 7 cells/biological samples collected under the same biological situation.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
gene 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
gene 2 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
gene 3 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
gene 4 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
gene 5 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
gene 6 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
gene 7 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
gene 8 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Table 3.2: Boolean matrix obtained via Algorithm 2 on the expression matrix
presented in Table 3.1.
possible boolean matrix derived from the expression data in Table 3.1 via the ap-
plication of the dichotomization algorithm described in Appendix A, considering
the gene `over-expression' as gene expression property and setting the param-
eter d equal to 0. The corresponding microarray game (f1;2;3;4;5;6;7;8g; ¹ v)
is reported in Table 3.3. Note that already with n = 8 genes, the number of
possible coalitions is 256 (in general 2n), making already di±cult the exhaustive
evaluation of the frequency of each coalition of genes in realizing the association
between the expression property and the biological condition considered.
3.4 The Shapley value of a microarray game
In Chapter 2 it has been proposed the Shapley value of a microarray game as
an index suitable to evaluate the role covered by each gene in realizing the as-
sociation between the expression property and the biological condition of the
original cell considered. In order to support this idea, in that chapter a bio-
logically sound axiomatic characterization of the Shapley value on the class of
microarray games has been proposed. This chapter is aimed to show that the
Shapley value of a microarray game is an unbiased estimator of the game on the44
S ¹ v(S) ^ ¾S S ¹ v(S) ^ ¾S S ¹ v(S) ^ ¾S S ¹ v(S) ^ ¾S
1 0.1429 0.1429 2 4 7 0.1429 0.1429 2 3 4 6 0.1429 0.1429 1 4 5 6 7 0.4286 0.2020
2 0.0000 0.0000 2 4 8 0.0000 0.0000 2 3 4 7 0.1429 0.1429 1 4 5 6 8 0.2857 0.1844
3 0.0000 0.0000 2 5 6 0.1429 0.1429 2 3 4 8 0.0000 0.0000 1 4 5 7 8 0.4286 0.2020
4 0.0000 0.0000 2 5 7 0.2857 0.1844 2 3 5 6 0.1429 0.1429 1 4 6 7 8 0.2857 0.1844
5 0.1429 0.1429 2 5 8 0.1429 0.1429 2 3 5 7 0.4286 0.2020 1 5 6 7 8 0.4286 0.2020
6 0.0000 0.0000 2 6 7 0.1429 0.1429 2 3 5 8 0.1429 0.1429 2 3 4 5 6 0.2857 0.1844
7 0.1429 0.1429 2 6 8 0.0000 0.0000 2 3 6 7 0.1429 0.1429 2 3 4 5 7 0.4286 0.2020
8 0.0000 0.0000 2 7 8 0.1429 0.1429 2 3 6 8 0.0000 0.0000 2 3 4 5 8 0.1429 0.1429
1 2 0.1429 0.1429 3 4 5 0.1429 0.1429 2 3 7 8 0.1429 0.1429 2 3 4 6 7 0.2857 0.1844
1 3 0.1429 0.1429 3 4 6 0.1429 0.1429 2 4 5 6 0.1429 0.1429 2 3 4 6 8 0.2857 0.1844
1 4 0.1429 0.1429 3 4 7 0.1429 0.1429 2 4 5 7 0.2857 0.1844 2 3 4 7 8 0.1429 0.1429
1 5 0.2857 0.1844 3 4 8 0.0000 0.0000 2 4 5 8 0.1429 0.1429 2 3 5 6 7 0.4286 0.2020
1 6 0.1429 0.1429 3 5 6 0.1429 0.1429 2 4 6 7 0.1429 0.1429 2 3 5 6 8 0.1429 0.1429
1 7 0.2857 0.1844 3 5 7 0.2857 0.1844 2 4 6 8 0.0000 0.0000 2 3 5 7 8 0.4286 0.2020
1 8 0.1429 0.1429 3 5 8 0.1429 0.1429 2 4 7 8 0.1429 0.1429 2 3 6 7 8 0.1429 0.1429
2 3 0.0000 0.0000 3 6 7 0.1429 0.1429 2 5 6 7 0.2857 0.1844 2 4 5 6 7 0.2857 0.1844
2 4 0.0000 0.0000 3 6 8 0.0000 0.0000 2 5 6 8 0.1429 0.1429 2 4 5 6 8 0.1429 0.1429
2 5 0.1429 0.1429 3 7 8 0.1429 0.1429 2 5 7 8 0.2857 0.1844 2 4 5 7 8 0.2857 0.1844
2 6 0.0000 0.0000 4 5 6 0.1429 0.1429 2 6 7 8 0.1429 0.1429 2 4 6 7 8 0.1429 0.1429
2 7 0.1429 0.1429 4 5 7 0.2857 0.1844 3 4 5 6 0.2857 0.1844 2 5 6 7 8 0.2857 0.1844
2 8 0.0000 0.0000 4 5 8 0.1429 0.1429 3 4 5 7 0.2857 0.1844 3 4 5 6 7 0.4286 0.2020
3 4 0.0000 0.0000 4 6 7 0.1429 0.1429 3 4 5 8 0.1429 0.1429 3 4 5 6 8 0.2857 0.1844
3 5 0.1429 0.1429 4 6 8 0.0000 0.0000 3 4 6 7 0.2857 0.1844 3 4 5 7 8 0.2857 0.1844
3 6 0.0000 0.0000 4 7 8 0.1429 0.1429 3 4 6 8 0.1429 0.1429 3 4 6 7 8 0.2857 0.1844
3 7 0.1429 0.1429 5 6 7 0.2857 0.1844 3 4 7 8 0.1429 0.1429 3 5 6 7 8 0.2857 0.1844
3 8 0.0000 0.0000 5 6 8 0.1429 0.1429 3 5 6 7 0.2857 0.1844 4 5 6 7 8 0.2857 0.1844
4 5 0.1429 0.1429 5 7 8 0.2857 0.1844 3 5 6 8 0.1429 0.1429 1 2 3 4 5 6 0.4286 0.2020
4 6 0.0000 0.0000 6 7 8 0.1429 0.1429 3 5 7 8 0.2857 0.1844 1 2 3 4 5 7 0.5714 0.2020
4 7 0.1429 0.1429 1 2 3 4 0.1429 0.1429 3 6 7 8 0.1429 0.1429 1 2 3 4 5 8 0.4286 0.2020
4 8 0.0000 0.0000 1 2 3 5 0.2857 0.1844 4 5 6 7 0.2857 0.1844 1 2 3 4 6 7 0.4286 0.2020
5 6 0.1429 0.1429 1 2 3 6 0.1429 0.1429 4 5 6 8 0.1429 0.1429 1 2 3 4 6 8 0.5714 0.2020
5 7 0.2857 0.1844 1 2 3 7 0.2857 0.1844 4 5 7 8 0.2857 0.1844 1 2 3 4 7 8 0.4286 0.2020
5 8 0.1429 0.1429 1 2 3 8 0.2857 0.1844 4 6 7 8 0.1429 0.1429 1 2 3 5 6 7 0.5714 0.2020
6 7 0.1429 0.1429 1 2 4 5 0.2857 0.1844 5 6 7 8 0.2857 0.1844 1 2 3 5 6 8 0.4286 0.2020
6 8 0.0000 0.0000 1 2 4 6 0.1429 0.1429 1 2 3 4 5 0.2857 0.1844 1 2 3 5 7 8 0.7143 0.1844
7 8 0.1429 0.1429 1 2 4 7 0.2857 0.1844 1 2 3 4 6 0.2857 0.1844 1 2 3 6 7 8 0.4286 0.2020
1 2 3 0.1429 0.1429 1 2 4 8 0.1429 0.1429 1 2 3 4 7 0.2857 0.1844 1 2 4 5 6 7 0.4286 0.2020
1 2 4 0.1429 0.1429 1 2 5 6 0.2857 0.1844 1 2 3 4 8 0.2857 0.1844 1 2 4 5 6 8 0.2857 0.1844
1 2 5 0.2857 0.1844 1 2 5 7 0.4286 0.2020 1 2 3 5 6 0.2857 0.1844 1 2 4 5 7 8 0.4286 0.2020
1 2 6 0.1429 0.1429 1 2 5 8 0.2857 0.1844 1 2 3 5 7 0.5714 0.2020 1 2 4 6 7 8 0.2857 0.1844
1 2 7 0.2857 0.1844 1 2 6 7 0.2857 0.1844 1 2 3 5 8 0.4286 0.2020 1 2 5 6 7 8 0.4286 0.2020
1 2 8 0.1429 0.1429 1 2 6 8 0.1429 0.1429 1 2 3 6 7 0.2857 0.1844 1 3 4 5 6 7 0.5714 0.2020
1 3 4 0.1429 0.1429 1 2 7 8 0.2857 0.1844 1 2 3 6 8 0.2857 0.1844 1 3 4 5 6 8 0.5714 0.2020
1 3 5 0.2857 0.1844 1 3 4 5 0.2857 0.1844 1 2 3 7 8 0.4286 0.2020 1 3 4 5 7 8 0.5714 0.2020
1 3 6 0.1429 0.1429 1 3 4 6 0.2857 0.1844 1 2 4 5 6 0.2857 0.1844 1 3 4 6 7 8 0.5714 0.2020
1 3 7 0.2857 0.1844 1 3 4 7 0.2857 0.1844 1 2 4 5 7 0.4286 0.2020 1 3 5 6 7 8 0.5714 0.2020
1 3 8 0.2857 0.1844 1 3 4 8 0.2857 0.1844 1 2 4 5 8 0.2857 0.1844 1 4 5 6 7 8 0.4286 0.2020
1 4 5 0.2857 0.1844 1 3 5 6 0.2857 0.1844 1 2 4 6 7 0.2857 0.1844 2 3 4 5 6 7 0.5714 0.2020
1 4 6 0.1429 0.1429 1 3 5 7 0.4286 0.2020 1 2 4 6 8 0.1429 0.1429 2 3 4 5 6 8 0.4286 0.2020
1 4 7 0.2857 0.1844 1 3 5 8 0.4286 0.2020 1 2 4 7 8 0.2857 0.1844 2 3 4 5 7 8 0.4286 0.2020
1 4 8 0.1429 0.1429 1 3 6 7 0.2857 0.1844 1 2 5 6 7 0.4286 0.2020 2 3 4 6 7 8 0.4286 0.2020
1 5 6 0.2857 0.1844 1 3 6 8 0.2857 0.1844 1 2 5 6 8 0.2857 0.1844 2 3 5 6 7 8 0.4286 0.2020
1 5 7 0.4286 0.2020 1 3 7 8 0.4286 0.2020 1 2 5 7 8 0.4286 0.2020 2 4 5 6 7 8 0.2857 0.1844
1 5 8 0.2857 0.1844 1 4 5 6 0.2857 0.1844 1 2 6 7 8 0.2857 0.1844 3 4 5 6 7 8 0.4286 0.2020
1 6 7 0.2857 0.1844 1 4 5 7 0.4286 0.2020 1 3 4 5 6 0.4286 0.2020 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 0.7143 0.1844
1 6 8 0.1429 0.1429 1 4 5 8 0.2857 0.1844 1 3 4 5 7 0.4286 0.2020 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 0.7143 0.1844
1 7 8 0.2857 0.1844 1 4 6 7 0.2857 0.1844 1 3 4 5 8 0.4286 0.2020 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 0.7143 0.1844
2 3 4 0.0000 0.0000 1 4 6 8 0.1429 0.1429 1 3 4 6 7 0.4286 0.2020 1 2 3 4 6 7 8 0.7143 0.1844
2 3 5 0.1429 0.1429 1 4 7 8 0.2857 0.1844 1 3 4 6 8 0.4286 0.2020 1 2 3 5 6 7 8 0.7143 0.1844
2 3 6 0.0000 0.0000 1 5 6 7 0.4286 0.2020 1 3 4 7 8 0.4286 0.2020 1 2 4 5 6 7 8 0.4286 0.2020
2 3 7 0.1429 0.1429 1 5 6 8 0.2857 0.1844 1 3 5 6 7 0.4286 0.2020 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 0.7143 0.1844
2 3 8 0.0000 0.0000 1 5 7 8 0.4286 0.2020 1 3 5 6 8 0.4286 0.2020 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 0.7143 0.1844
2 4 5 0.1429 0.1429 1 6 7 8 0.2857 0.1844 1 3 5 7 8 0.5714 0.2020 N 1.0000 0.0000
2 4 6 0.0000 0.0000 2 3 4 5 0.1429 0.1429 1 3 6 7 8 0.4286 0.2020 ; 0.0000 0.0000
Table 3.3: The microarray game corresponding to the boolean matrix in Table
3.2.45
entire population of original cells de¯ned in (3.3).
Given a TU-game (N;v) as de¯ned by relation (3.3), from equation (1.2) it
turns out that to calculate the Shapley value of player i 2 N in v corresponds
to calculate the expected marginal contribution, over all orderings, of gene i
in realizing the association between the expression property and the considered
biological condition of the original cell in the coalition of players who precede
i. On the other hand, note that formula (1.2) is computationally intractable
due to the number coalitions (2n with n = jNj) that must be considered for
each i 2 N. Luckily, formula (1.3) can be used to reduce the computational
complexity to polynomial dimension in the number of genes n.
Let P T be the probability distribution on the set f0;1g where 1 means that
all the genes in T show the expression property considered and no genes outside
of T show the same expression property and 0 means that not all the genes in T
show the expression property or at least one gene in N nT show the expression
property, for each S 2 2N n f;g. Then, for each S 2 2N n f;g, the probability
FS(1) can be calculated as follows











In fact, I P(fi 2 TjGi = 1g = T) is the probability the exactly all the genes
in T show the expression property under consideration, for each T 2 2N n f;g.
Moreover, it is easy to see that
¹ FS = F S(1) =
P
T22Snf;g ¹ PT; (3.9)
where ¹ PS is the expectation of the probability distribution P S for each
S 2 2N n f;g.
Consequently, it is possible to decompose the characteristics function v(S)







where uS is the unanimity game on coalition S.








where jSj is the cardinality of the set S.
In an analogous way to what we presented in the last section, given a boolean
matrix B 2 f0;1gn£k corresponding to a microarray experiment with n genes
and k samples, we can check whether sp(Bj) = S, for each S 2 2N n f;g,
¯nally deriving 2N ¡1 random samples of size k from the unknown probability




k » P S; (3.12)
for each S 2 2N nf;g and with zS
j 2 f0;1g for each j = 1;:::;k such that zS
j = 1
if in the j-th sample the set of genes which show the expression property under
consideration coincide with S (i.e. sp(Bj) = S) and with zS
j = 0 otherwise.












k for use as an estimate of the expectation of P S for each S 2 2N n f;g .
Since any linear combination of unbiased estimators is unbiased for the same
linear combination of the parameters (by the linearity of the expectations),
an unbiased estimator of the Shapley value Á(v) in the TU-game (N;v) is by







for each i 2 N.
Now, we want to show that the unbiased estimator ¹ Ái(v) of the Shapley
value in the game (N;v) equals the Shapley value Ái(¹ v) of the microarray game
(N; ¹ v). First consider, for each j 2 f1;:::;kg, the random variables ZS
j , for
each S 2 2N n f;g can be transformed to form other random variables Y i
j , for












jSj, for each j 2 f1;:::;kg and for each i 2 N.
Remark 5 Note that for each j 2 f1;:::;kg and each pair of coalition S;T 2
2N n f;g with S 6= T, the realizations of events ZS
j = 1 and ZT
j = 1 are
incompatible, then realizations of Y i
j , for each j 2 f1;:::;kg and each i 2 N,












































k for each i 2 N, we





k for use as an estimate of the






= ¹ Ái(v) (3.16)
for each i 2 N.
Note also that each observation of the random variable Y i
j , for each j 2
f1;:::;kg, corresponds to the Shapley value of player i 2 N in the corresponding
microarray game observed as realizations of the random variables XS
j , for each




































for each i 2 N, where the ¯rst equality follows from relation (3.2), the second
one follows from relation (1.3), the third one from Remark 5 and the fourth one
from relation (3.16).
Relation (3.17) means that the estimation of Shapley value ¹ Á(v) on the TU-
game v coincide with the Shapley value of the microarray game ¹ v














¹ Ái(v) for each i 2 N is the estimated standard error of ¹ Y i = ¹ yi = ¹ Ái(v).48
gene i Ái(¹ v) ^ ¾Ái
gene 1 0.19047619 0.13363062
gene 2 0.06428571 0.03915020
gene 3 0.15952381 0.05526212
gene 4 0.07619048 0.04797486
gene 5 0.17857143 0.13223131
gene 6 0.07619048 0.04797486
gene 7 0.17857143 0.13223131
gene 8 0.07619048 0.04797486
Table 3.4: Shapley value of the microarray game presented in Table 3.3 and its
estimate of the accuracy.
Example 11 Consider the boolean matrix B of Table 3.2 and the corresponding
microarray game (N; ¹ v) in Table 3.3 of Example 10. The Shapley value of the
microarray game (N; ¹ v) and its estimated standard error is reported in Table 3.4.
Note that the most relevant gene according to the Shapley value Á(¹ v) is gene 1
directly followed by gene 5 and gene 7 with the same relevance and gene 3, with
a lower Shapley value than genes 1,5 and 7. Note that gene 3 has a standard
error much lower than gene 1,5 and 7 (about 33% of its Shapley value against
the 66% of the respective Shapley values for genes 1,5,and 7) so its relevance
index, although a bit smaller, could be more reliable than the higher relevance
index observed on the other genes.
Next section shows that in comparing Shapley values of single genes in microar-
ray games corresponding to di®erent biological conditions of the original cells,
the observed variability of the Shapley value across the biological samples plays
an important role.
3.5 Test statistics
Consider a boolean matrix B 2 f0;1gn£k corresponding to a data set from an
expression microarray experiment with n genes and k cells/biological samples
which has been dicretized according to a discriminant method (for example the
algorithm provided in the Appendix).
Suppose that samples can be partitioned in two groups, according to two
di®erent biological conditions of the original cells (let us say condition 1 and
2) where samples are collected. Without loss of generality, let F 1 = f1;:::;hg
be the group of samples under condition 1 and let F 2 = fh + 1;:::;kg be the
group of samples under condition 2, for some h 2 f1;:::;k ¡ 1g.49
Let BF
1
2 f0;1gn£h and BF
2
2 f0;1gn£(k¡h) be the two matrix obtained
from B such that BF
1
j = Bj for each j 2 f1;:::;hg and BF
1
j = Bj+h for each
j 2 f1;:::;k ¡ hg.





, respectively. Let Á(¹ v1) be the Shapley value
on the game ¹ v1 and let Á(¹ v2) be the Shapley value on the game ¹ v2.
We want to answer the following question: is the Shapley value of the gene i
in determining the association between the expression property under consider-
ation and condition 1 signi¯cantly di®erent from the Shapley value of the same
gene i in determining the association between the expression property under
consideration and condition 2, for each i 2 N?
Consider the following observed di®erence of Shapley values
±i(Á(¹ v1);Á(¹ v2)) := jÁi(¹ v1) ¡ Ái(¹ v2)j; (3.19)
for each i 2 N, where Ái(¹ v1) is the Shapley value of gene i in the microarray
game corresponding to the boolean matrix BF
1
and Ái(¹ v2) is the Shapley value
of gene i in the microarray game corresponding to the boolean matrix BF
2
.
Our goal in this section is to propose a method that can test the null hypoth-
esis that a gene has no di®erences of Shapley values between the two conditions
1 and 2. In fact we want to test the null hypothesis that ±i(Á(¹ v1);Á(¹ v2)) = 0
against the alternative hypothesis that ±i(Á(¹ v1);Á(¹ v2)) 6= 0.
Let P S
1 , for each S 2 2N n f;g, be the probability distribution on the set
f0;1g in the population of original cells in condition 1. As we already said in
Section 3, the event 1, which can happen with probability P S
1 (1) = I P(fi 2
SjGi = 1g = S)I P(fi 2 N n SjGi = 1g = ;), means that all the genes in S show
the expression property considered and no genes outside of S show the same
expression property; the event 0 means that not all the genes in S show the
expression property or at least one gene in N nS show the expression property.
Let P S
2 , for each S 2 2N n f;g, be the probability distribution on the set f0;1g
in the population of original cells in condition 2, with an analogous meaning.
Consider the random samples of size h from the unknown probability distri-
bution P S







h » P S
1 ; (3.20)
for each S 2 2N n f;g and with z
1;S
j 2 f0;1g for each j = 1;:::;k such that
z
1;S
j = 1 if in the j-th sample the set of genes which show the expression property50
under consideration coincide with S (i.e. if sp(BF
1
j ) = S) and z
1;S
j = 0 if
sp(BF
1
j ) 6= S.
Similarly, consider the random samples of size k ¡ h from the unknown
probability distribution P S







k¡h » P S
2 : (3.21)
for each S 2 2N n f;g and with z
2;S
j 2 f0;1g for each j 2 f1;:::;kg such
that z
2;S
j = 1 if in the j-th sample the set of genes which show the expression
property under consideration coincide with S (sp(BF
2
j ) = S) and z
2;S
j = 0 if
sp(BF
2
j ) 6= S.

















jSj for each j 2










for each t 2 f1;:::;ng and f 2 f1;2g.
Suppose that there are no evidences in favor of a priori assumptions concern-
ing neither the parametric nature of probability QS
1 and QS
2, nor the equality
between the two probability distributions QS
1 and QS
2 under the null hypothesis.
In such a situation we found appropriate to use a test procedure based
on a non parametric bootstrap methods of re-sampling with replacement (see
Efron and Tibshirani (1993), Efron and Gong (1983) as general introduction
to bootstrap methods; see Bickel (2002) as a bootstrap application to microar-
ray analysis), which is able to test the null hypothesis of no di®erence between
two means of two random samples without assuming under the null hypothe-
sis that the probability distributions in the populations are the same. In this
respect, remember that via relation (3.17), the Shapley value of gene i of the
microarray game corresponding to BF
1
is the mean of the random sample Y
1;i
j ,
j 2 f1;:::;hg, and the Shapley value of the microarray game corresponding to
BF
2
is the mean of the random sample Y
2;i
j , j 2 f1;:::;k ¡hg, for each i 2 N.
We describe the nonparametric approach to estimate the (un-adjusted for
multiple comparisons) p-values in the next algorithm:51
Algorithm 1 (Multiple hypotheses test for Shapley di®erences)
INPUT: a boolean matrix B 2 f0;1gn£k, n;k 2 f1;2;:::g, with n rows (genes)
and k columns (samples); a partition fF 1;F2g of the set of k samples; an integer
number m of Monte Carlo bootstrap re-samples (with replacement).
OUTPUT: a bootstrap statistics of Shapley value di®erences for each one of the
n genes; a vector of n (un-adjusted for multiple comparisons) estimated p-values.
step 1 : Compute the observed Shapley value di®erence ±i(Á(¹ v1);Á(¹ v2)) for
each i 2 N;
step 2 : Fix m as the number of Monte Carlo bootstrap re-samples (with re-
placement).
step 3 : for r : 1 to m
©
step 4.r Let sr;1 = (s
r;1
j )j2f1;:::;hg 2 f1;:::;hgh and sr;2 = (s
r;2
j )j2f1;:::;hg
2 f1;:::;k ¡ hgk¡h be the vectors representing the r-th bootstrap re-
sample (with replacement) on the cells/biological samples in condition
1 and 2, respectively.
step 5.r Consider the new boolean matrix Bs
r;1





j for each j 2 f1;:::;hg and the boolean matrix Bs
r;2
2




j for each j 2 f1;:::;h ¡ jg.













r) ¡ Á(¹ v2)
¢¯
¯; (3.24)
for each i 2 N, where ¹ v1
r; ¹ v2
r 2 MG are the microarray games corre-






step 7 : for each i 2 N, compute the (un-adjusted for multiple comparisons)
estimate Achieved Signi¯cance Level (ASL) or p-value pi of each gene




¯ ¯ ¯fr 2 f1;:::;mg : ±r
i(Á(¹ v1
r);Á(¹ v2
r)) ¸ ±i(Á(¹ v1);Á(¹ v2))g
¯ ¯ ¯: (3.25)
Remark 6 In order to preserve the ties among genes in each sample, on step
5.r, the entire columns of the boolean matrix B are re-sampled according to the
vectors sr;1 and sr;2 de¯ned on step 4.r, for each r 2 f1;:::;mg.52
Remark 7 Subtracting Á(¹ v1
r) and Á(¹ v2
r) in (3.24 from the Shapley values in




, respectively, makes the bootstrap
Shapley values correspond to the null hypotheses that ±i(Á(¹ v1) = 0 (Efron and
Tibshirani (1993), Bickel (2002)).
Note that the estimated p-values provided by bootstrap methods (with replace-
ment) are less exact than p-values obtained from permutation tests (without
replacement) (see e.g. Dudoit et al.(2002)) but, as we already mentioned, can
be used to test the null hypothesis of no di®erences between the means of two
statistics (Efron and Tibshirani (1993)) without assuming that the distributions
are otherwise equal (see also Bickel (2002)).
Applying the previous algorithm to a microarray game, thousands of null
hypothesis can be tested separately; so we need to consider the problem of mul-
tiple comparison. In fact, if n is the number of statistical tests, each performed
at level ®, if the tests are independent, the expected number of false positive
is ®n, which is very large for large n. It is possible to alleviate this problem
by adjusting the individual p-value of the tests for multiplicity. Several meth-
ods have been proposed in literature to tackle this problem (see for a summary
Amaratunga and Cabrera (2004)), mainly assuming independence of the test
statistics. In Algorithm 1, test statistics are likely not independent; in fact they
are statistics on the Shapley value distribution in the population of genes, which
should be representative of the relevance of each gene (interacting with many
others) in determining the association between the genes expression property
of groups of genes and the biological condition of the original cell under con-
sideration. On the other hand the problem of multiplicity is still there, but
to establish its entity is even harder with respect to the case of test statistics
independency.
Moreover, given the very high number of null hypothesis tested in a typi-
cal microarray game, aggressively adjusting the p-values for multiplicity could
seriously impede the ability of the test to ¯nd genes with respective relevance
index which are truly di®erent under the two biological conditions at hand.
Traditional statistical procedures often control the family-wise error rate
(FWER), i.e. the probability that at least one of the true null hypothesis is
rejected. Classical p-value adjustment methods for multiple comparisons which
control FWER have been found to be too conservative in analyzing di®eren-
tial expression in large-screening microarray data, and the False Discovery Rate53
(FDR), i.e. the expected proportion of false positives among all positives, has
been recently suggested as an alternative for controlling false positives (Ben-
jamini and Hochberg (1995), Dudoit et al. (2002)). It is not possible at this
moment to express similar considerations suitable for the game theoretical con-
text in which we are moving.
For all these reasons, in the sequel we separately present the results provided
by our method controlling for the FDR and for the FWER, respectively, facing
the problem of possible dependent statistical tests. One possible approach is
to make estimation for both FDR and FWER using again re-sampling methods
(Bickel (2002), Jain et al. (2005)).
Let V (c) be the average number of bootstrap Shapley value di®erences equal










¯ ¯ ¯; (3.26)
with the convention that the cardinality of the empty set is zero, i.e. j;j = 0.
Let R(c) be the average number of observed Shapley value di®erences equal to
or greater than c, in formula
R(c) =
¯ ¯ ¯fi 2 N : ±i(Á(¹ v1);Á(¹ v2)) ¸ cg
¯ ¯ ¯: (3.27)
The simplest way to estimate FDR at the a threshold value c is obtained via





to control the estimated FDR at a level ², let ° be the minimum value of
±i(Á(¹ v1);Á(¹ v2)) for which \ FDR(±i(Á(¹ v1);Á(¹ v2))) · ² and reject the j-th null
hypothesis if ±i(Á(¹ v1);Á(¹ v2)) ¸ °.
For what concerns controlling the FWER, as we already said di®erent ap-
proach have been proposed. Here we present a method to adjust the p-values
obtained in step 7 of Algorithm 1 according to a procedure introduced in Bickel











¸ ±i(Á(¹ v1);Á(¹ v2))g
¯ ¯ ¯;
(3.29)
given the FWER ®0, reject the i-th null hypothesis if ~ pi · ®0.54
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
gene 1 9 -1 8 0 -3 0 1
gene 2 7 14 -1 -2 0 0 -1
gene 3 -1 -2 -1 4 6 10 13
gene 4 0 8 14 -1 -1 0 0
gene 5 5 1 10 0 0 1 -1
gene 6 13 0 8 0 0 -1 -2
gene 7 1 14 7 0 0 -1 -1
gene 8 8 0 13 0 -2 -1 0
Table 3.5: Another toy example of microarray expression matrix with n = 8
genes and k = 7 samples and the same expression values as in Table 3.1.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
gene 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
gene 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
gene 3 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
gene 4 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
gene 5 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
gene 6 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
gene 7 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
gene 8 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Table 3.6: Boolean matrix obtained by the application of Algorithm 2 to the
expression matrix in Table 3.5.
Example 12 Consider another toy example of microarray expression matrix
with n = 8 genes and k = 7 samples Note that the expression vector of each gene
i 2 f1;:::;8g takes the same values of the corresponding i-th expression vector
in Table 3.1 (in other terms, the values in the i-th row, for each i 2 f1;:::;8g, in
Table 3.1 are obtained as a permutations of the values in the i-th row in Table
3.1. So, no genes con be considered abnormally expressed with respect their
expression pro¯les in Table 3.1 and 3.5, respectively. Following the terminology
used in this section, we will refer to this new situation as the condition 2, whereas
the situation introduced in Example 10 will be referred as condition 1.
If we apply the same discriminant method used in Example 10 on Table 3.1,
i.e. Algorithm 2 described in Appendix A with the same input parameters, we
¯nd the same cuto®s used to obtain the Boolean matrix in Table 3.2. Given the
new form of the expression matrix in Table 3.5, the corresponding boolean matrix
will be the one presented in Table 3.6. We escape the presentation of the table
representing the microarray game corresponding to the new boolean matrix in
Table 3.6. Instead we directly present, the table of the Shapley values and their
estimated standard errors in Table 3.7. Comparing the respective Shapley value
for each gene i 2 f1;:::;8g in Tables 3.4 and 3.7, it is interesting to see that in55
gene i Ái(v) ^ ¾Ái
gene 1 0.05238095 0.03181045
gene 2 0.07619048 0.04797486
gene 3 0.57142857 0.18898224
gene 4 0.07142857 0.04636239
gene 5 0.05238095 0.03181045
gene 6 0.05238095 0.03181045
gene 7 0.07142857 0.17857143
gene 8 0.05238095 0.07619048
Table 3.7: Shapley value of the microarray game corresponding to the boolean










Table 3.8: Un-adjusted for multiple comparisons p-values obtained by Algorithm
1 applied to the microarray expression matrix presented in Table 3.1 and 3.5.
this new situations only genes 2 and 3 increase their respective Shapley values.
Gene 3 increases its Shapley value of about four times even if its expression
vector is exactly the same of Table 3.1 (expression values for row 3 in Table 3.1
have not been permuted in Table 3.5).
Applying the test method described in Algorithm 1 to the boolean matrix
in Table 3.6 with 1000 re-samples, we estimated the table of (un-adjusted for
multiple comparisons) p-values presented in Table 3.8
Performing the control of the estimated FDR as introduced in relation (3.28)
at a level ² = 0:05, the unique null hypothesis of no Shapley value di®erences
between condition 1 and 2 that can be rejected is the one for gene 3. The
same conclusion is inferred performing the control for the adjusted p-values as
introduced in relation (3.29) at a FWER ®0 = 0:05.
3.6 Analysis of real data
This section is devoted to the presentation of the results from the application of
Algorithm 1 to the gene expression data-set (3051 genes and 38 tumor mRNA
samples, 27 acute lymphoblastic leukemia (ALL) cases and 11 acute myeloid56
leukemia (AML)) from the leukemia microarray study of Golub et al. (1999).
Pre-processing was done as described in Dudoit et al. (2002), implemented by
the R Development Core Team (2004) code in the Bioconductor package multtest
(Gentleman et al. (2204)).
The resulting real-valued expression matrix (3051 rows, 38 columns) has
been dichotomized according to Algorithm 2 described in Appendix A. Sorting
the real-valued expression data of each gene (see step 2 in Algorithm 2), it has
been observed that many genes presented at most three very low values with
respect the average expression. One consequence was that the thresholds for
binarization selected by Algorithm 2 took the position very close to the big jump
corresponding to such low-bound outliers. For this reason, it has been decided
to exclude the three lowest value of each row in the application of Algorithm 2
and hence to set the low-bound outliers parameter d = 3. Thresholds selected by
Algorithm 2 for nine genes have been presented in Figure 3.1. The output from
the application of Algorithm 2 was stored in a boolean matrix B 2 f0;1g3051£38.
Algorithm 1 has been applied to the boolean matrix B, with the partition
fF1;F2g of the 38 samples such that all the 11 AML samples belong to the set
F1 and the remaining 27 ALL samples belong to the set F 2. The number of
bootstrap re-samples with replacement was m = 1000. Figure 3.2 shows, for
¯ve genes, the histograms of the Shapley values observed in the two classes of
samples and the corresponding bootstrap statistic of Shapley di®erences.
Figure 3.3 shows the QQ plot of the observed Shapley value di®erences and
the expected Shapley value di®erences produced by Algorithm 1. The graph
shows 70 genes whose di®erence in terms of Shapley values is greater than
0:0004614116 and 77 genes whose di®erence in terms of Shapley values is lower
than ¡0:0004614116, for a total number of 147 genes which corresponds to the
number of rejected null hypothesis when the estimated FDR is controlled at a
level 0:05, according with relation (3.28).
Figure 3.4 shows the plotting of the corrected p-values controlling the FWER
at a level of 0:05 using the procedure introduced via relation (3.29). The set of
40 null hypothesis rejected in this case is a subset of the set of 147 rejected null
hypothesis controlling the estimated FDR at level 0:05. In Table 3.9 are reported
details for the identi¯cation of the 40 genes corresponding to the rejected null
hypothesis controlling the FWER at the level of 0:05, together with the Shapley
value observed in the game built on the 11 AML samples (fourth column),57
the Shapley value observed in the game built on the 27 ALL samples (¯fth
column) and the corresponding adjusted p-value provided by the FWER control
at the level 0:05. Similar information is provided in Table 3.10, concerning the
remaining 107 rejected null hypothesis when the control is performed on the
estimated FDR at a level of 0:05.
The Shapley values distributions observed in the two sample groups have
been plotted in Figure 3.5.
3.7 Discussion
In this chapter, a new method to analyze the relevance of genes in the mech-
anisms which provoke a biological condition or a response of interest has been
described, based on the game theoretical model introduced in Chapter 2. The
main novelty of the approach, with respect the model of Chapter 2, is that the
present method considers the stochastic process governing the gene expression
observations and its level of in°uence in determining di®erences of the observed
relevance index of genes under two distinct biological conditions or responses of
interest.
An application of the method to the gene expression data set from the
leukemia microarray study by Golub et al. (1999) is presented.
Preliminary examination of the literature concerning the role of the signi¯-
cant genes presented in Table 3.8 provides evidence of the e®ective capacity of
Algorithm 2 in selecting genes with an e®ective role in pathogenesis of subtypes
of leukemia. For example, over-expression of the TCL1 oncogene has been shown
to play a causative role in T cell leukemias of humans and mice (Narducci et
al. (2002). IFI 16 gene product is a nucleoprotein expressed in association with
the di®erentiation of myeloid precursor cell lines (Dawson and Trapani (1995)).
Other genes were already known as leukemia markers. As already observed
by Golub et al. (1999), CD33 and MB-1 encode cell surface proteins for which
monoclonal antibodies have been demonstrated to be useful in distinguishing
lymphoid from myeloid lineage cells.
Other markers of hematopoietic lineage provided in Table 3.8, observed again
by Golub et al. (1999) and related to cancer pathogenesis, are Cyclin D3, which
encodes proteins critical for S-phase cell cycle progression, and zyxin, which
encodes proteins for adhesion.58
SPTAN1 is involved in secretion and it interacts with calmodulin in a calcium-
dependent manner and has been indicated as good marker for ALL in two studies
using gene expression data to distinguish subtypes of leukemia (Armstrong et
al. (2002), Tan et al. (2005)).
LYN is an oncogene and Hasegawa et al. (2001) proved that the expression of
Cd19, which is also in Table 3.8, is required for the development of autoimmunity
in Lyn de¯cient mice. Note that the Shapley value of LYN is 0:000729 in the
AML microarray game and it is 0 in the ALL microarray game, whereas the
Shapley value of Cd19 is more or less the opposite with respect to LYN.59
3.8 Figures and Tables




























































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.1: Sorted expression values (on the y-axis) corresponding to 38 sam-
ples (labels on the x-axis) for nine genes of the Golub et al. (1999) data-set.
Dichotomization thresholds (y-coordinate of circles placed on the right vertical
straight line) have been selected by Algorithm 2. Real-valued expressions which
are strictly lower than the threshold have been labelled by 0, whereas expression
values higher than or equal to the threshold have been labelled by 1. Values on
the left side of the index labelled by the left vertical straight line have not been
taken into account in the algorithmic computation of the thresholds.60
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Figure 3.2: In the ¯rst two columns of the ¯gure, the histograms of the Shapley
values observed for genes in AML and ALL samples, respectively, have been
given, for ¯ve genes. The last column shows the corresponding histograms of
Shapley value di®erences obtained via the bootstrap procedure described in
Algorithm 1 under the null hypothesis of no di®erence between the Shapley
values computed under the two conditions AML and ALL. The vertical straight
line indicates the mean of the respective distributions.61







1 FAH Fumarylacetoacetate M55150 at 0.000939 0 0
2 Cytoplasmic dynein light chain 1 (hdlc1) mRNA U32944 at 0 0.000925 0
3 Leukotriene C4 synthase (LTC4S) gene U50136 rna1 at 0.000937 0 0
4 Zyxin X95735 at 0.001142 0 0
5 CCND3 Cyclin D3 M92287 at 0 0.000896 0.001
6 CD22 CD22 antigen X59350 at 0.000105 0.000981 0.001
7 Interleukin 8 (IL8) gene M28130 rna1 s at 0.001039 0.000132 0.001
8 MYL1 Myosin light chain (alkali) M31211 s at 0 0.000898 0.001
9 CYSTATIN A D88422 at 0.000935 8.86E-05 0.002
10 GLUTATHIONE S-TRANSFERASE, MICROSOMAL U46499 at 0.000935 8.08E-05 0.002
11 PROTEASOME IOTA CHAIN X59417 at 0 0.000852 0.002
12 INTERLEUKIN-8 PRECURSOR Y00787 s at 0.001039 0.000174 0.002
13 DF D component of complement (adipsin) M84526 at 0.000832 0 0.003
14 Phosphotyrosine independent ligand p62 for the Lck SH2 domain mRNA U46751 at 0.000829 0 0.003
15 Small Nuclear Ribonucleoprotein, Polypeptide C, Alt. Splice 2 HG1322-
HT5143 s at
0.000204 0.001021 0.004
16 Inducible protein mRNA L47738 at 0.000207 0.001013 0.005
17 PEPTIDYL-PROLYL CIS-TRANS ISOMERASE, MITOCHONDRIAL PRE-
CURSOR
M80254 at 0.000829 4.56E-05 0.007
18 GB DEF = (lambda) DNA for immunoglobin light chain D88270 at 0 0.000764 0.01
19 ATP6C Vacuolar H+ ATPase proton channel subunit M62762 at 0.000935 0.000168 0.01
20 MB-1 gene U05259 rna1 at 0 0.000764 0.01
21 CD19 gene M84371 rna1 s at 0 0.000764 0.01
22 DHPS Deoxyhypusine synthase U26266 s at 0.00021 0.000975 0.01
23 ANPEP Alanyl (membrane) aminopeptidase (aminopeptidase N, aminopep-
tidase M, microsomal aminopeptidase, CD13)
M22324 at 0.000837 7.87E-05 0.011
24 MAJOR HISTOCOMPATIBILITY COMPLEX ENHANCER-BINDING
PROTEIN MAD3
M69043 at 0.000928 0.000171 0.011
25 Dihydropyrimidinase related protein-2 U97105 at 0.000305 0.001061 0.013
26 Interferon-gamma induced protein (IFI 16) gene M63838 s at 0.00031 0.001054 0.017
27 LYN V-yes-1 Yamaguchi sarcoma viral related oncogene homolog M16038 at 0.000729 0 0.021
28 CD33 CD33 antigen (differentiation antigen) M23197 at 0.000729 0 0.021
29 IGB Immunoglobulin-associated beta (B29) M89957 at 0 0.000726 0.021
30 CTSD Cathepsin D (lysosomal aspartyl protease) M63138 at 0.000723 0 0.023
31 SPTAN1 Spectrin, alpha, non-erythrocytic 1 (alpha-fodrin) J05243 at 0.000423 0.001144 0.025
32 GB DEF = Neurotensin receptor X70070 at 0.000928 0.000207 0.025
33 TCL1 gene (T cell leukemia) extracted from H.sapiens mRNA for Tcell
leukemia/lymphoma 1
X82240 rna1 at 0 0.000722 0.025
34 KIAA0097 gene D43948 at 0 0.000718 0.026
35 NF-IL6-beta protein mRNA M83667 rna1 s at 0.000829 0.000129 0.035
36 ALDR1 Aldehyde reductase 1 (low Km aldose reductase) X15414 at 0.000407 0.001106 0.036
37 Gal-beta(1-3/1-4)GlcNAc alpha-2.3-sialyltransferase X74570 at 0.00104 0.000339 0.036
38 Spermidine/spermine N1-acetyltransferase (SSAT) gene U40369 rna1 at 0.000829 0.000132 0.038
39 KIAA0200 gene D83785 at 0.000104 0.000798 0.039
40 Nuclear factor NF45 mRNA U10323 at 0.000205 0.000895 0.045
Table 3.9: Genes with adjusted p-values for FWER control lower than 0:05.62












































































Figure 3.3: QQ plot of the observed Shapley value di®erences and the expected
Shapley value di®erences produced by Algorithm 1. Null hypothesis of genes
with observed Shapley values di®erence outside the interval between the two
horizontal straight lines have been rejected controlling the FDR at the level
0:05.63







41 TCF12 Transcription factor 12 (HTF4, helix-loop-helix transcription factors
4)
M83233 at 0 0.000671 0.075
42 Transcription factor (CBFB) mRNA, 3' end L20298 at 0.000304 0.00097 0.08
43 Fc-epsilon-receptor gamma-chain mRNA M33195 at 0.000834 0.000169 0.083
44 ANX1 Annexin I (lipocortin I) X05908 at 0.001041 0.000379 0.088
45 SERYL-TRNA SYNTHETASE X91257 at 0.000312 0.000971 0.092
46 GTF2E2 General transcription factor TFIIE beta subunit, 34 kD X63469 at 0.000313 0.000967 0.101
47 KIAA0235 gene, partial cds D87078 at 0.00011 0.000755 0.113
48 PIM1 Pim-1 oncogene M16750 s at 0.000724 8.16E-05 0.116
49 Adenosine triphosphatase, calcium Z69881 at 0.000424 0.001064 0.12
50 V-ERBA RELATED PROTEIN EAR-1 M24900 at 0.000928 0.000287 0.12
51 KIAA0067 gene D31891 at 0.000208 0.000843 0.131
52 CD24 signal transducer mRNA and 3' region L33930 s at 0 0.000634 0.131
53 FTH1 Ferritin heavy chain L20941 at 0.000724 9.05E-05 0.133
54 Orphan receptor mRNA, partial cds U07132 at 0.000929 0.000299 0.139
55 IRF2 Interferon regulatory factor 2 X15949 at 0 0.000629 0.141
56 CA2 Carbonic anhydrase II Y00339 s at 0.000627 0 0.148
57 MEF2A gene (myocyte-specific enhancer factor 2A, C9 form) extracted from
Human myocyte-specific enhancer factor 2A (MEF2A) gene, first coding
U49020 cds2 s at 0 0.000626 0.15
58 CST3 Cystatin C (amyloid angiopathy and cerebral hemorrhage) M27891 at 0.000625 0 0.153
59 TRANSFORMATION-SENSITIVE PROTEIN IEF SSP 3521 M86752 at 0.000311 0.000936 0.153
60 Azurocidin gene M96326 rna1 at 0.000624 0 0.154
61 MANB Mannosidase alpha-B (lysosomal) U05572 s at 0.000624 0 0.154
62 ZNF91 Zinc finger protein 91 (HPF7, HTF10) L11672 at 0.000521 0.001144 0.156
63 LGALS3 Lectin, galactoside-binding, soluble, 3 (galectin 3) (NOTE: redefi-
nition of symbol)
M57710 at 0.000622 0 0.158
64 PFC Properdin P factor, complement M83652 s at 0.000622 0 0.158
65 Pre-Mrna Splicing Factor Sf2p33, Alt. Splice Form 1 HG3546-
HT3744 s at
9.76E-05 0.000719 0.158
66 Nuclear Factor Nf-Il6 HG3494-
HT3688 at
0.00062 0 0.159
67 PRKAR1A CAMP-dependent protein kinase regulatory subunit type I M33336 at 0.000321 0.000926 0.195
68 BZIP protein NF-IL3A (IL3BP1) mRNA U26173 s at 0.000726 0.000127 0.217
69 ORF, Xq terminal portion D16469 at 0.000937 0.000339 0.219
70 SMT3A protein X99584 at 0.000935 0.000343 0.237
71 SNRPN Small nuclear ribonucleoprotein polypeptide N J04615 at 0.000512 0.001102 0.243
72 ARHG Ras homolog gene family, member G (rho G) X61587 at 0.001142 0.000555 0.255
73 AFFX-HUMTFRR/M11507 M at (endogenous control) AFFX-
HUMTFRR/M11507 M at
0.000627 4.39E-05 0.282
74 SELL Leukocyte adhesion protein beta subunit M15395 at 0.000625 4.21E-05 0.284
75 SPI1 Spleen focus forming virus (SFFV) proviral integration oncogene spi1 X52056 at 0.000834 0.000254 0.288
76 MCM3 Minichromosome maintenance deficient (S. cerevisiae) 3 D38073 at 0.000524 0.0011 0.304
77 NFKB2 Nuclear factor of kappa light polypeptide gene enhancer in B-cells 2
(p49/p100)
S76638 at 0.000614 4.21E-05 0.321
78 Epican, Alt. Splice 1 HG2981-
HT3125 s at
0.001039 0.00047 0.337
79 BLK Protein-tyrosine kinase blk S76617 at 0 0.000556 0.391
80 Protein phosphatase 2A 74 kDa regulatory subunit (delta or B subunit)" L76702 at 0.000208 0.017788
81 DGUOK Deoxyguanosine kinase U41668 at 0.000425 0.000975 0.421
82 HMOX1 Heme oxygenase (decycling) 1 X06985 at 0.001142 0.000592 0.422
83 Novel T-cell activation protein X94232 at 0.000518 0.001064 0.438
84 Clone CIITA-8 MHC class II transactivator CIITA mRNA U18259 at 0 0.000545 0.442
85 KIAA0063 gene D31884 at 0.001142 0.000599 0.444
86 ORF mRNA M68864 at 0.00052 0.001063 0.445
87 K+ channel beta 2 subunit mRNA U33429 at 0.000621 8.08E-05 0.461
88 HS1 binding protein HAX-1 mRNA, nuclear gene encoding mitochondrial
protein
U68566 at 0.00031 0.00085 0.461
89 PIM1 Pim-1 oncogene M54915 s at 0.000621 8.16E-05 0.461
90 ACADM Acyl-Coenzyme A dehydrogenase, C-4 to C-12 straight chain M91432 at 0.00052 0.001054 0.482
91 Serine palmitoyltransferase (LCB2) mRNA, partial cds U15555 at 0.00062 8.68E-05 0.483
92 MEF2C MADS box transcription enhancer factor 2, polypeptide C (myocyte
enhancer factor 2C)
L08895 at 0.000105 0.000639 0.483
Table 3.10: Genes corresponding to rejected null hypothesis (together with genes
in Table 3.9) when controlling the estimated FDR at the level 0:05 (follows).64





































Figure 3.4: Plot of the corrected p-values controlling the FWER at a level of
0:05. The null hypothesis of genes with ~ p below the horizontal straight line have
been rejected.65
93 OAT Ornithine aminotransferase (gyrate atrophy) M29927 at 0.001037 0.000505 0.487
94 ATM Ataxia telangiectasia mutated (includes complementation groups A, C
and D)
U33841 at 0.000104 0.000634 0.495
95 Ionotropic ATP receptor P2X5a mRNA U49395 at 0.000104 0.000633 0.499
96 Major Histocompatibility Complex, Dg HG1872-
HT1907 at
0.000827 0.000298 0.504
97 SELL Leukocyte adhesion protein beta subunit X64072 s at 0.001039 0.00051 0.504
98 Chromosome segregation gene homolog CAS mRNA U33286 at 0.000104 0.000632 0.507
99 Mac25 HG987-HT987 at 0.001039 0.000514 0.518




102 CATHEPSIN G PRECURSOR J04990 at 0.00052 0 0.543
103 IL2RG Interleukin 2 receptor gamma chain D11086 at 0.000626 0.001144 0.554
104 GB DEF = Beta-2 integrin alphaD subunit (ITGAD) gene, exons 25-30, and
partial cds
U40279 at 0.000718 0.000201 0.556
105 Oncoprotein 18 (Op18) gene M31303 rna1 at 0.00063 0.001144 0.577
106 Folylpolyglutamate synthetase mRNA M98045 at 0.00021 0.000724 0.579
107 Epican, Alt. Splice 11 HG2981-
HT3127 s at
0.000514 0 0.58
108 Putative enterocyte differentiation promoting factor mRNA, partial cds U62136 at 0.000631 0.001144 0.581
109 PPGB Protective protein for beta-galactosidase (galactosialidosis) M22960 at 0.000513 0 0.582
110 HLA CLASS I HISTOCOMPATIBILITY ANTIGEN, F ALPHA CHAIN PRE-
CURSOR
X17093 at 0 0.000512 0.587
111 Adult heart mRNA for neutral calponin D83735 at 0.000935 0.000425 0.59
112 CaM kinase II isoform mRNA U81554 at 0.001142 0.000632 0.591
113 MST1R Protein-tyrosine kinase RON X70040 at 0.001142 0.000634 0.602
114 OBF-1 mRNA for octamer binding factor 1 Z49194 at 0 0.000508 0.602
115 POLYPOSIS LOCUS PROTEIN 1 M73547 at 0 0.000508 0.605
116 DLX7 Distal-less homeobox 7 U73328 at 0.001142 0.000635 0.611
117 HKR-T1 S50223 at 0 0.000506 0.619
118 DNA-dependent protein kinase catalytic subunit (DNA-PKcs) mRNA U47077 at 0 0.000504 0.623
119 Butyrophilin (BTF5) mRNA U90552 s at 0 0.000503 0.629
120 Clone 23721 mRNA sequence U79291 at 0 0.000501 0.635
121 GB DEF = Cystic fibrosis antigen mRNA M26311 s at 0.000935 0.000434 0.636
122 Transcription factor SIM2 long form mRNA U80457 at 0.000214 0.000713 0.644
123 PRG1 Proteoglycan 1, secretory granule X17042 at 0.001142 0.000644 0.647
124 SNCA Synuclein, alpha (non A4 component of amyloid precursor) U46901 at 0.000623 0.000125 0.649
125 Carboxyl Methyltransferase, Aspartate, Alt. Splice 1 HG1400-
HT1400 s at
0.000518 0.001012 0.663
126 ATP6E ATPase, H+ transporting, lysosomal (vacuolar proton pump) 31kD X71490 at 9.76E-05 0.00059 0.668
127 Autoantigen DFS70 mRNA, partial cds U94319 at 0.000105 0.000592 0.685
128 Tryptase-III mRNA, 3' end M33493 s at 0.000524 3.88E-05 0.693
129 PRKCB1 Protein kinase C, beta 1 X06318 at 0.000105 0.000586 0.716
130 Lysophosphatidic acid acyltransferase-beta mRNA U56418 at 0.001038 0.000558 0.722
131 CSNK1D Casein kinase 1, delta U29171 at 0.000524 4.49E-05 0.723
132 KIAA0030 gene, partial cds D21063 at 0.000629 0.001106 0.727
133 LPAP gene X97267 rna1 s at 0.000629 0.001106 0.73
134 RSU-1/RSP-1 mRNA L12535 at 0.001142 0.000666 0.734
135 TCRB T-cell receptor, beta cluster M12886 at 0.000415 0.000891 0.735
136 PHB Prohibitin S85655 at 0.000207 0.000683 0.735
137 DAGK1 Diacylglycerol kinase, alpha (80kD) X62535 at 0.00063 0.001106 0.735
138 TFIID subunit TAFII55 (TAFII55) mRNA U18062 at 0.000627 0.001102 0.736
139 Transcriptional activator hSNF2b D26156 s at 0 0.000471 0.748
140 LGALS1 Ubiquinol-cytochrome c reductase core protein II J04456 at 0.000937 0.000467 0.751
141 Non-histone chromosomal protein (NHC) mRNA U90549 at 0.00063 0.001101 0.751
142 PRKCD Protein kinase C, delta D10495 at 0.000514 4.56E-05 0.755
143 GLUL Glutamate-ammonia ligase (glutamine synthase) M63438 s at 0.001142 0.000674 0.755
144 Low-Mr GTP-binding protein (RAB32) mRNA, partial cds U59878 at 0.000927 0.000461 0.761
145 GOT2 Glutamic-oxaloacetic transaminase 2, mitochondrial (aspartate
aminotransferase 2)
M22632 at 0 0.000466 0.764
146 DNA-binding protein ABP/ZF mRNA U82613 at 0.000208 0.00067 0.777
147 MHC-encoded proteasome subunit gene LAMP7-E1 gene (proteasome sub-
unit LMP7) extracted from H.sapiens gene for major histocompatibility com-
plex encoded proteasome subunit LMP7
Z14982 rna1 at 0.00052 0.000981 0.777
Follows Table 3.10.66

















































































































Figure 3.5: Shapley values on AML and ALL corresponding to 147 rejected null
hypothesis controlling the FDR at the level of 0:05. Dots labelled with numbers
correspond to genes with adjusted p-values ~ p lower than 0:05. Numerical labels
refer to ID numbers in Table 3.9 and 3.10.Chapter 4
Other games on gene
expression data
4.1 Minimum cost spanning tree and gene ex-
pression
Microarray games are based on a dichotomization process applied to a real-
valued expression matrix. In this chapter we present an alternative class of
cooperative games where the dichotomization process is not required. On the
other hand, a di®erent way to asses the value of each coalition must be used
to avoid the arbitrariness in choosing the cuto®s to dichotomize the expression
data. First, a method based on the framework of Minimum Cost Spanning
Trees (MCSTs) has been introduced to represent the interaction structure of
the involved genes. In gene expression analysis Xu et al. (2001) and Speer
et al. (2003) have already used MCSTs representation as starting point for
clustering algorithms. Here we exploit the MCSTs representation of a gene
expression data-set to construct a corresponding MCST game.
Similarly to the case of microarray games, the objective of this di®erent
class of games is again to evaluate the genes relevance in provoking a biological
condition or response of interest. With this goal, the approach here is to describe
the overall level of similarity (or dissimilarity) of each sub-group of genes with
a reference vector of expressions representing a pre-selected gene (or a group of
6768
pre-selected genes) which is assumed not to be involved in the processes related
to the biological condition or response of interest under studying. Di®erently
stated, observed °uctuations in the expression values of a reference gene across
the samples, should uniquely be ascribed to experimental random noise.
Note that the concept of association between expression properties and bi-
ological conditions realized in coalitions of genes, in this context must be re-
formulated to catch the idea of association between real valued gene expression
vectors and biological conditions. The smaller the overall level of similarity of
a coalition with a reference gene expression vector is, the higher the level of
association of real valued gene expression vectors with the biological condition
or response of interest should be.
To avoid the arbitrariness related to the dichotomization cuto®s is not the
only advantage of this new approach. In comparison with the microarray game
model, this new model based on MCSTs also improves the resolution of the
analysis. For example, it is well known that genes that are co-regulated by
common transcription factors have similar expression patterns. A characteristic
function based on levels of similarity among genes is highly representative of the
in°uence of di®erent transcription factors in all possible clusters of co-regulated
genes. With respect to microarray games, the application of a relevance index
to games based on MCST representation would be more e±cient in selecting
those genes who are able to regulate other genes.
4.1.1 Preliminary notations
Here we introduce some basic notions on graph theory. An (undirected) graph is
a pair < V;E >, where V is a set of vertices or nodes and E is a set of edges e of
the form fi;jg with i;j 2 V , i 6= j. The complete graph on a set V of vertices is
the graph < V;EV >, where EV = ffi;jgji;j 2 V and i 6= jg. A path between
i and j in a graph < V;E > is a sequence of nodes (i0;i1;:::;ik), where i = i0
and j = ik, k ¸ 1, and such that fis;is+1g 2 E for each s 2 f0;:::;k ¡ 1g.
A path (i0;i1;:::;ik) is without cycles if there do not exist a;b 2 f0;1;:::;kg,
a 6= b, such that ia = ib.
Now, we consider MCST situations. In an MCST situation a set N =
f1;:::;ng of agents is involved willing to be connected as cheap as possible to a
source denoted by 0. In the sequel we use the notation S0 for S [ f0g, for each
S µ N. An MCST situation can be represented by a tuple < N0;EN0;w >,69
where < N0;EN0 > is the complete graph on the set N0 of nodes or vertices,
and w : EN0 ! I R+ is a map which assigns to each edge e 2 EN0 a nonnegative
number w(e) representing the weight or cost of edge e. We call w a weight
function.
The cost of a network ¡ µ EN0 is w(¡) =
P
e2¡ w(e). A network ¡ is a
spanning network on S0 µ N0 if for every e 2 ¡ we have e 2 ES0 and for every
i 2 S there is a path in ¡ from i to the source. Given a spanning network
¡ on N0 we de¯ne the set of edges of ¡ with nodes in S0 µ N0 as the set
E¡
S0 = ffi;jgjfi;jg 2 ¡ and i;j 2 S0g.
For any MCST situation w 2 WN
0
it is possible to determine at least one
spanning tree on N0, i.e. a spanning network without cycles on N0, of minimum
cost; each spanning tree of minimum cost is called an MCST for N0 in w or,
shorter, an MCST for w. Two famous algorithms for the determination of
minimum cost spanning trees are the algorithm of Prim (1957) and the algorithm
of Kruskal (1956).
The characteristic function of the minimum cost spanning tree game (G;cw)
(or simply cw) (Bird (1976); see also Granot and Huberman (1981), Feltkamp
(1995)), corresponding to a MCST situation < G0;w > based on a gene expres-
sion data-set X, is de¯ned by
cw(S) = minfw(¡)j¡ is a spanning network on S0g (4.1)
for every S 2 2Gnf;g, with the convention that cw(;) = 0.
4.1.2 MCST situations based on a gene expression data-
set
Consider a microarray experiment on a ¯nite set G0 = f1;:::;gg[f0g of genes
studied in k di®erent samples where gene 0 is the reference gene, that is the
vector of expression values of a gene that should be constantly not expressed
across the di®erent samples. Let X = (xi)i2G0 be a set of expression vectors
xi = (xi1;:::;xik) 2 I Rk, representing the expression value of gene i 2 G0 across
k samples. Let x0 = (x01;:::;x0k) be the expression vector of the reference
gene. Such a vector could be obtained averaging the expression vectors of a set
of invariant genes (see Chapter 5.5 in Amaratunga and Cabrera (2004) for a
de¯nition of invariant genes).70
We de¯ne a MCST situation based on a gene expression data-set X as the
tuple < G0;w >, where each edge fu;vg 2 EG0 has a weight that is equal to the
dissimilarity measure d(xu;xv), where d : X £ X ! I R+ states quantitatively
how dissimilar xu and xv are to each other. Note that we do not require that a
dissimilarity function would be a metric on X. 1
We simply require that function d satis¯es at least the property of symmetry
and non-negativity on X.
Consider the microarray MCST game (G;cd) (or simply cd), corresponding
to a MCST situation < G0;w > based on a gene expression data-set X (and
with weight function w corresponding to the dissimilarity measure d on X), is
de¯ned by
cd(S) =
minfw(¡)j¡ is a spanning network on S0g
minfw(¡)j¡ is a spanning network on G0g
(4.2)
for every S 2 2Gnf;g, with the convention that cd(;) = 0. We chose to divide
the cost of the MCST on each coalition S 2 2Gnf;g by the cost of the MCST
on the great coalition G0 in order to make possible the comparison of MCST
games based on gene expression data-sets obtained from experiments performed
on di®erent sets of samples. Alternatively to de¯nition (4.2), one can obtain the
MCST game cd directly by de¯nition (4.1) as the MCST game corresponding
to the MCST situation (G0; ^ w), where
^ w(fu;vg) =
w(fu;vg)
minfw(¡)j¡ is a spanning network on G0g
:
In the next example we present two di®erent approaches to the analysis of
microarray MCST games, whose essential di®erences follows from the kind of
information known on data-sets.
Example 13 Consider the real-valued expression matrix X in Table 4.1, on
genes G0 = f0;1;2;3g, where 0 is the reference gene, and all genes are collected
from 7 samples, such that samples 1;2;3;4 come from the biological condition 1
and samples 5;6;7 come from the biological condition 2. Therefore, we can split
1A metric m on a set N is a function m : N £ N ! I R+, such that for each i;j 2 N we
have
m(i;j) ¸ 0 and m(i;i) = 0 (non-negativity);
m(i;j) = m(j;i) (symmetry);
m(i;k) · m(i;j) + m(j;k) (triangle inequality);
if i 6= j then m(i;j) > 0 (positivity for distinguished points);71
samples: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
genes
0 0.2 0.3 -0.1 0 0.1 -0.2 0.05
1 9 -3 2 -1 -2 8 -1
2 2.9 3 2.8 3.2 3.1 2.6 3.4
3 -1 -1 -2 -4 6 4 3
Table 4.1: A toy gene expression matrix on 4 genes (0 is the invariant gene) and
7 samples; f1;2;3;4g are samples under the biological condition 1 and f5;6;7g
are samples under the biological condition 2
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In this example we use the Euclidean distance as dissimilarity measure, i.e. for
each u;v 2 G0 we consider the metrics e1 and e2 on X1 and X2, respectively,










where k1 = 4 and k2 = 3.
The (approximated) values of e1(x1
u;x1
v) between each pair of genes u;v 2
f0;1;2;3g is represented by the weights of the edges in the following completed
graph.
The microarray MCST game (G;ce1), corresponding to the MCST situation
under the biological condition 1, is such that ce1(f1g) = 0:6, ce1(f2g) = 0:36,
ce1(f3g) = 0:3, ce1(f1;2g) = 0:95, ce1(f1;3g) = 0:9, ce1(f2;3g) = 0:65, ce1(f1;2;
3g) = 1.
The (approximated) values of e2(x2
u;x2
v) between each pair of genes u;v 2
f0;1;2;3g is represented by the weights of the edges in the following completed
graph.
The microarray MCST game (G;ce2), corresponding to the MCST situation un-































Figure 4.1: The MCST situation under the biological condition 1. The thick































Figure 4.2: The MCST situation under the biological condition 2. The thick
lines show the MCST on G0.
0:31, ce2(f3g) = 0:46, ce2(f1;2g) = 0:81, ce2(f1;3g) = 0:96, ce2(f2;3g) = 0:5,
ce2(f1;2;3g) = 1.
Example 14 Consider again the toy data-set in Table 1, but now suppose that
no information about sample labels with respect to biological conditions 1 and 2.
Then, using again the Euclidean distance, The (approximated) values of
e(xu;xv) between each pair of genes u;v 2 f0;1;2;3g is represented by the
weights of the edges in the following completed graph.
The microarray MCST game (G;ce) is such that (G;ce) is ce(f1g) = 0:43,
ce(f2g) = 0:26, ce(f3g) = 0:31, ce(f1;2g) = 0:69, ce(f1;3g) = 0:74, ce(f2;3g) =
0:57, ce(f1;2;3g) = 1.
Another useful dissimilarity measure to use with microarray data (see for
instance chapter 9.2.1 in Amaratunga and Cabrera (2004)) is the function
½(xu;xv) = 1 ¡ jr(xu;xv)j; (4.4)




































k=1;:::;k(xuk ¡ ¹ xu)(xvk ¡ ¹ xv)
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j=1;:::;k(xuj ¡ xu)2 P




for each pair u;v 2 G0, where ¹ xu =
P
k=1;:::;k xuk and ¹ xv =
P
k=1;:::;k xvk. The
dissimilarity measure ½ takes values in the interval [0;1] and increases toward
its maximum value of 1 the less linearly correlated xu and xu are. On the other
hand, ½ is not a metric. 2
The (approximated) values of ½(xu;xv) between each pair of genes u;v 2
































Figure 4.4: An MCST situation with three genes. The thick lines show the
MCST on G0.
The corresponding microarray MCST game (G;c½) is c½(f1g) = 0:41, c½(f2g) =
2Take for example vectors a = (1;0;0);b = (0;1;0);c = (¡1;1;0) 2 I R3 and note that
½(a;b) = 0:5 > ½(a;c) + ½(c;b) = 0:2679492, i.e. the triangle inequality is not satis¯ed. Of
course function ½ does not satisfy neither the positivity for distinguished points condition,
since for example ½((1;2);(2;4)) = 0.74
0:30, c½(f3g) = 0:36, c½(f1;2g) = 0:64, c½(f1;3g) = 0:77, c½(f2;3g) = 0:69,
c½(f1;2;3g) = 1.
Given a microarray MCST game (G;c½) based on a microarray gene expres-
sion data-set, it is possible to apply a one-point solution for TU-games. For
example, we could calculate the Shapley value of ce1;ce2 and c½.
Example 15 The following table shows the Shapley values of games ce1;ce2
and c½ in Example 13 and Example 17. Note that in the case where it is known
player: 1 2 3
Á(ce1) 0.48 0.28 0.24
Á(ce2) 0.5 0.18 0.32
Á(ce) 0.43 0.26 0.31
Á(c½) 0.36 0.27 0.37
Table 4.2: Shapley value Á() of four di®erent microarray MCST games.
the partition of samples with respect to the biological conditions, gene 1 has an
high Shapley value in both microarray MCST games ce1 and ce2, whereas gene
2 and 3 have an opposite behavior under the two conditions (when one of them
has high Shapley value, the other one has a low Shapley value). If we look at
the di®erences of Shapley values between the two conditions 1 and 2, we observe
for gene 1 a di®erence close to zero, and for gene 2 and 3 di®erences closed to
0:1. In conclusion, gene 1 seems heavily involved in the mechanisms regulating
both conditions; on the contrary, the Shapley values of genes 2 and 3 seem to
di®erentiate more the two conditions.
Looking at the game ce, corresponding to the MCST situation on the whole
data-set, it appears that genes 2 and 3 increases their relevance with respect to
gene 1, obtaining more or less the respective maximum between the two sepa-
rated games ce1 and ce2. This e®ect is even more evident when the dissimilarity
measure ½, which is aimed to measure linear correlation among expression vec-
tors, is used and the corresponding microarray MCST game c½ is analyzed. In
fact, note that gene 3 obtains a slightly greater Shapley value of gene 1. In our
opinion, the correct interpretation of this fact is that on the whole data-set the
Shapley value is able to provide hints about those genes which are able to dis-
criminate well among two or more unknown di®erent biological conditions under75
which samples are collected. In other terms, our conjecture is that the Shapley
value on microarray MCST games is able to select genes which change much
across the samples both in terms of expression values and in terms of similarity
with the other genes.
Of course, it is not possible to justify the use of the Shapley value as relevance
index for genes on the basis of few examples. Even less correct would be to
claim that the Shapley value is able to quantify the gene relevance on the class
of microarray MCST games merely on the basis of the properties introduced in
Chapter 2, which were de¯ned just for another class of TU-games, the class of
microarray games.
One possible way to proceed is again to propose sound properties, possibly
with a biological meaning, that a relevance index applied on the class of mi-
croarray MCST games should satisfy and then to axiomatically characterize the
Shapley value on the class of microarray MCST games, analogously to what we
did in Chapter 2 for microarray games.
In any case, recall that to calculate the Shapley value for microarray MCST
games is not easy for computational reasons. In fact, with the exception of
few cases where the weight function of the MCST situation satis¯es certain
properties, to calculate the Shapley value of microarray MCST games with
n players requires the computation of 2n¡1 marginal contribution, which is
a very big value when n takes the size of the number of genes analyzed in
a conventional microarray experiments. In these cases a possible alternative
which is polynomially computable is the solution called P-value by Branzei et
al. (2004), already introduced in Feltkamp et al. (1994) as Equal Remaining
Obligations rule and studied in Branzei et al. (2004), Tijs et al. (2004) also in
connection with the Shapley value and other solutions in Tijs et al. (2005) and
Moretti et al. (2005). Of course, it remains the open question on the justi¯cation
of the use of the P-value as relevance index for microarray MCST games, whose
answer could be provided once again by the property driven approach. In next
example we show the normalized version of P-value on the four games introduced
in Examples 13 and 17, without giving a formal de¯nition of the P-value. For a
formal de¯nition of the P-value solution see for example Branzei et al. (2004).
Example 16 The following table shows the P-values of games ce1;ce2 and c½
in Example 13 and Example 17. Relevance index provided by the P-value so-76
player: 1 2 3
P(ce1) 0.47 0.29 0.24
P(ce2) 0.5 0.25 0.25
P(ce) 0.43 0.26 0.31
P(c½) 0.33 0.30 0.36
Table 4.3: P-value P() of four di®erent microarray MCST games.
lution seems to °atten the observed di®erences of Shapley values among genes
calculated in Example 15.
4.1.3 Future work
Concerning the class of MCST games, there are many possible directions that
can be addressed. First of all, it would be important to improve the understand-
ing of the model potentiality, in particular with respect the \good" dissimilarity
measure to be used and the meaning of the reference gene. For example, the
problem of ¯nding a good estimate of the reference gene is still an open question
and, apparently, it is strongly related to the problem of data normalization in
the pre-processing analysis of microarray games.
As we already stressed in the previous section, another point that should
deserve more attention is the axiomatic characterization of di®erent relevance
index on the class of MCST games. The property driven approach would have
a very important role in practice, for the selection of a proper relevance index.
This approach would be useful also to make better interpretations of the results.
For example, it is not clear at this moment why the P-value, at least on few
small examples, shows such a °attening behavior as shown in Example 16.
To study the connections with the statistical method introduced in Chapter
2, it would be useful to understand whether a procedure similar to Algorithm
1 for ¯nding signi¯cant Shapley value di®erences between two biological con-
ditions can be maintained also for MCST games or, alternatively, which new
assumptions should be introduced in order to achieve the same purposes.
With respect to practice, ¯nally, the applications of the model to real data
should be necessary to make a comparison with the results provided by microar-
ray games.77
4.2 Microarray games and the classi¯cation prob-
lem
As we already noted in the previous chapters, the goal of many analytical meth-
ods applied to gene expression data-sets is to develop a classi¯cation rule, that
is a criterium to predict, as accurately as possible, the true class of samples.
For example, suppose that some samples are collected from a class of tumors
and some other from normal tissues, and their labels with respect to these two
classes is known. The idea is to use in some way the information available ei-
ther on single genes or on combination of genes as classi¯ers for classifying the
samples into the right classes. Since most of genes contribute to add noise and
to obfuscate the separation between classes, only few genes are able to perform
almost correct discriminations. In order to select the set of genes with the best
performance in classifying samples, the analytical method must solve a very
hard problem: maximize the proportion of correct classi¯cation and minimize
the number of misclassi¯cation in the data-set under consideration.
In this section we try to answer to the following interesting question: is the
Shapley value of a microarray game of any help in studying the ability of genes
in well classifying tumor samples according to a certain classi¯cation rule?
First note that the Shapley value of a microarray game seems meaningless
as classi¯cation power index, since a microarray game does not consider any
classi¯cation information in its characteristics function. On the other hand,
intuitions based on the results provided by the application of the Shapley value
on microarray games seem to go in the direction of a quite positive answer.
In the attempt to yield an analytical explanation of this fact, ¯rst of all we
need to introduce a very simple classi¯cation rule based on boolean data.
For simplicity, we will consider only two classes, let us say the biological
conditions 1 and 2. Moreover, we will refer to a dichotomized gene expression
data-set. Let B1 2 f0;1gn£k1 and B2 2 f0;1gn£k2 be two boolean matrix,
where n is the number of genes, k1 is the number of samples under the biological
condition 1 (for example, samples from normal tissues), k2 is the number of
samples under the biological condition 2 (for example, samples from tumoral
tissues) and if Bt
ij = 1 for some i 2 f1;:::;ng = N, j 2 f1;:::;ktg and
t 2 f1;2g, then it means that gene i in sample j and condition t shows a certain
expression property (for example, it is over-expressed) and if Bt
ij = 0 then it78
means that gene i in sample j and condition t does not show such expression
property.
Consider the following classi¯cation rule based on the subset of genes in
S 2 2N n f;g:
< if there exists i 2 S such that Bt
ij = 1, then classify sample j 2 f1;:::;ktg
under the biological condition t 2 f1;2g in class 1 >. (F)
Let rc(S) be the rate of correct classi¯cations provided by the classi¯cation
rule (F) applied on the data-set (B
t)t2f1;2g using the set of genes S 2 2N nf;g
and let rm(S) be the rate of misclassi¯cations made via the classi¯cation rule
(F) applied on the data-set (B
t)t2f1;2g using the set of genes S. Then we de¯ne
the classi¯cation game (N;d1) as the TU-game on N with the characteristic
function d : 2N ! [¡1;1] such that
d1(S) = rc(S) ¡ rm(S); (4.6)
for each S 2 2N n f;g.
Remark 8 We can provide an alternative de¯nition of classi¯cation game using
dual unanimity games, which will be useful later. Recall that a dual unanimity
game (N;u¤
T), T 2 2N, is a TU-game described by uT(S) = 1 if R \ T 6= ; and
uR(T) = 0, otherwise.








where j­(T)j is the cardinality of the set
­(S) = fj 2 f1;:::;k1gjsp(B1
j) \ S 6= ;g
and ¹ v(;) = 0 and j¢(S)j is the cardinality of the set
¢(S) = fj 2 f1;:::;k2gjsp(B2
j) \ S 6= ;g

















for each S 2 2N n ;, where (N;u¤
sp(Bj)) is the dual unanimity game on the set
sp(Bt
j), t 2 f1;2g.
Remark 9 One could use the classi¯cation rule:
< if there exists i 2 S such that Bt
ij = 1, then classify sample j 2 f1;:::;ktg
under the biological condition t 2 f1;2g in class 2 >, (²)
for each S 2 2N n ;, and de¯ne the classi¯cation game (N;d2) according to
relation (4.6) or (4.7). Note that d2(S) = ¡d1(S) for each coalition S 2 2N n ;.
A well known results for TU-games is that the Shapley value of a unanimity
game on T 2 2N nf;g is equal to the Shapley value of the dual unanimity game






for each i 2 N, where Á(uT) is the Shapley value on the unanimity game uT and
Á(u¤
T) is the Shapley value on the dual unanimity game u¤
T, for each T 2 2Nnf;g.
Relation (4.9) makes Proposition 3 straightforward.
Proposition 3 Let B1 2 f0;1gn£k1 and B2 2 f0;1gn£k2 be two boolean ma-
trix. Let (N;v1) be the microarray game corresponding to B1 and Let (N;v2)
be the microarray game corresponding to B2. Moreover, Let (N;d1) be the clas-
si¯cation game corresponding to Bt, t 2 f1;2g and to classi¯cation rule (F).
Then
Á(d1) = Á(v1) ¡ Á(v2): (4.10)
Proof It follows directly by relations (1.3), (4.9), (3.2) and (4.8).
By Remark 9 follows that the absolute value jÁi(d1)j = jÁi(v1) ¡ Ái(v2)j
provides an indication of the ability of gene i in discriminating the two classes
1 and 2, for each i 2 N. Note that, in order to test the null hypothesis that
jÁi(v1)¡Ái(v2)j = 0, a bootstrap procedure was introduced in Chapter 2. Note
also that, if it exists i 2 N such that the coalition S is the unique coalition which
classi¯es correctly all the samples under condition 1 and does not misclassi¯es
any samples under condition 2, then Ái(d1) = maxi2NÁi(d1) for each i 2 S.80
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1) = f1;3g, sp(B1
2) = f2;3g, sp(B1
3) = f1;2;4g and sp(B2
1) = f1;2g,
sp(B2
2) = f1;4g, sp(B2
3) = f3g and sp(B2
4) = f1;4g.
The classi¯cation game (f1;2;3;4g;d1) corresponding to Bt, t 2 f1;2g and







6; d1(f1g) = d1(f1;4g) = d1(f2;4g) = 2
3 ¡ 3
4 = ¡ 1
12; d1(f1;2g) =
d1(f3;4g) = d1(f1;3g) = 1 ¡ 3
4 = 1 ¡ 1





4; d1(f1;3;4g) = d1(f2;3;4g) = d1(f1;2;3g) = d1(f1;2;3;4g) = 0.





72). The maximum classi¯cation power is allocated to gene 3 and 2.
4.2.1 Future work
Classi¯cation games provide a di®erent interpretation of microarray games, in
terms of the classi¯cation information contained in the characteristics function.
Of course all these argumentations are coherent with the classi¯cation rule (F)
(or, alternatively, with the classi¯cation rule (²)). These classi¯cation rules are
simple methods to classify samples (even if to evaluate the performance of the
classi¯cation rule (F) on each coalition is not at all simple when the number
of genes is high; once again this problem can be partially avoided during the
Shapley value computations thanks to Proposition 3 and the considerations
made in Chapter 2 on microarray games). It would be very interesting to
study classi¯cation games corresponding to more complex classi¯cation rules,
for example based on Support Vector Machines (Cortes and Vapnik (1995))
and other supervised classi¯cation technique applied to each coalition of genes.
In this context, the Shapley value of classi¯cation games based on di®erent
classi¯cation rules could be also informative in comparing the validity of di®erent
classi¯ers.81
4.3 Analysis of gene expression data from Real
Time PCR
In this section we present a brief description of very preliminary results provided
by a gene expression analysis concerning 19 samples collected from neurob-
lastic tumors, in particular 10 neuroblastoma (Schwannian stroma-poor) (NB-
SP) samples and 9 Ganglioneuroblastoma intermixed (Schwannian stroma-rich)
(GNBi-SR). The goal of this analysis was to screen and to give a priority level
to genes according to their connections in di®erentiating and provoking NB-SP
and GNBi-SR tumors.
The analysis is divided in two parts. In the ¯rst one, the expression values
of 22283 genomic sequences from the 19 samples have been assessed using the
Human Genome U133A GeneChip microarray technology (A®ymetrix, Inc, CA,
USA).
The second part of the analysis is based on the same samples, but the data
collection has not yet concluded at this moment. In this case, the data collection
of only 126 genes is done by means of quantitative Real Time PCR (Polymerase
Chain Reactions), a very accurate (and much more expensive with respect to
GeneChip A®ymetrix microarray technology) method to evaluate gene expres-
sions on a gene-by-gene basis. Real Time PCR is commonly used in biomedical
literature as a con¯rmation of microarray results (see for example Amaratunga
et al. (2004)).
In both the analysis, all data have been collected by the Unit of Translational
Paediatric Oncology of the National Institute for Cancer Research (IST) and
the Laboratory of Italian Neuroblastoma Foundation of the Advanced Biotech-
nology Center (ABC), both located in Genoa (Italy). For more details on the
connections among the neuroblastic tumors under studying and for a statistical
pre-analysis on a smaller data-set see our previous work in Coco et al. (2005).
From the ¯rst analysis, concerning microarray gene expression data, the
raw data have been pre-processed using the function expresso in the package
a®y in Bioconductor libraries (Gentleman et al. (2004)), normalizing using the
Variance Stabilization Normalization (vsn) method (Huber et al. (2002)).
On the microarray normalized data-set we performed two di®erent proce-
dures. The ¯rst procedure has been based on the application of the Statistical
Analysis of Microarray (SAM) (Storey and Tibshirani (2003)), in order to ¯nd82
genes which are signi¯cantly di®erential expressed between the two conditions
NB-SP and GNBi-SR. Controlling the FDR at a level approximately equal to
zero (0:000005), the SAM method called 88 genes as signi¯cant.
The second procedure has been based on the game theoretical approach
described in Chapter 2. For each one of the two conditions NB-SP and GNBi-
SR, a microarray game has been constructed and the corresponding Shapley
value has been computed on it. Then, for each gene, the absolute value of the
observed di®erence of Shapley values of the two microarray games has been
calculated. We selected the ¯rst 49 genes with the highest absolute value of
Shapley di®erence. The overlap of genes selected by the two methods (SAM
and microarray game) was of 11 genes. Note that at the time when this analysis
has been performed, Algorithm 1 described in Chapter 2 was not yet completed.
Here the number 49 re°ects the constraint, due to practical reasons, implying
that only 126 genes could be validated in the following analysis based on Real
Time PCR.
4.3.1 Future work
As we already said, a Real Time PCR analysis has been planned to be used to
con¯rm the results obtained by the two statistical procedure in the ¯rst part of
the analysis, concerning microarray data.
Here we brie°y anticipate the results of the validation procedure, at this
moment performed on only 15 of the 19 samples (the remaining 4 samples are
currently under experiment in the laboratories).
For what concerns the set of genes called signi¯cant by the SAM method, up
to now we can only report that the agreement rate between the Real Time PCR
technology and the GeneChip A®ymetrix technology in indicating the condition
(GNBi-SR or NB-SP) where the average expression value of the genes is greater
is about 98%.
For what concerns the set of genes selected applying microarray games, a
similarly high rate of agreement has been observed. On the other hand, we want
to point out that in this case genes have been selected according to their Shapley
values on microarray games, and that the Shapley value of a microarray game
keeps into account both the expression values of genes and their cooperative
interactions. For these reasons in our opinion the more accurate information
about the agreement in average expression values provided by Real Time PCR83
is not enough to con¯rm the results obtained by means of the game theoretical
method. In this direction, we ¯nd reasonable to apply Algorithm 1 to the
dataset of 49 genes analyzed by Real Time PCR and to observe how many
genes e®ectively show their Shapley values signi¯cantly di®erent between the
two conditions. A ¯rst attempt of application of Algorithm 1 to the Real Time
PCR expression data-set concerning those 49 genes, suggests the rejection of 46
null hypothesis of no di®erences in terms of Shapley values when controlling the
FDR at a level of 0:05. In our opinion, this is a quite positive response in the
direction of the validation of the microarray game analysis.84
Figure 4.5: QQ plot of the observed Shapley value di®erences and the expected
Shapley value di®erences produced by Algorithm 1. Application of Algorithm 1
to the Real Time PCR expression data-set concerning 49 selected genes suggests
the rejection of 46 null hypothesis. Null hypothesis of genes with Shapley values
di®erence observed on Real Time PCR data which are outside the interval be-
tween the two continuous horizontal straight lines have been rejected controlling
the FDR at the level 0:05.Appendix A
Dichotomization algorithm
In this appendix we face the problem of transforming real-valued gene expres-
sions into binary values. This problem can be solved using a procedure which
selects thresholds. In Shmulevich and Zhang (2002) an algorithm to ¯nd an
individually selected threshold for each normalized gene expression vector is
presented. For each gene expression vector, the basic idea of such an algorithm
is to sort all the real-valued expression values and to locate the threshold in
correspondence of the smallest separation between two successive sorted val-
ues which is greater than a prede¯ned value, called the `big jump'. In their
algorithm implementation, the author used as prede¯ned value in given a gene
expression vector the length of the interval between to successive sorted values
in the `the worst case', that is when all the values in the gene expression vector
are equally spaced between the maximum and the minimum.
Since the case in which the sorted true values are equally spaced between the
maximum and the minimum is in fact the most critical one to be binarized, we
think that the `big jump' used by Shmulevich and Zhang (2002) is very sensitive
to small °uctuations on the observed values due to random noise. Therefore, we
present a di®erent version of the algorithm, where the `big jump' is calculated via
an iterative procedure. As formally explained in the following pseudo-code, at
each iteration, the algorithm provide a candidate value directly proportional to
di®erence between the maximum and the minimum and inversely proportional
to the number of iterations already done. Our algorithm ¯xes the `big jump'
as the biggest `candidate value' smaller than some separations between two
8586
successive sorted values.
Algorithm 2 (Dichotomize) INPUT: a real-valued expression matrix G 2
I Rn£k, with n rows (i.e. genes) and k columns (i.e. samples); a low-bound outlier
parameter d.
OUTPUT: a boolean matrix B 2 f0;1gn£k, n;k 2 f1;2;:::g.
step 1 : Si Ã sort(Gi;1;:::;Gi;k); 8i 2 N;
step 2 : for j : 1 to k ¡ 1 do
Di;j Ã sort(Si;j+1 ¡ Si;j); 8i 2 N;
end do
step 3 : for l : 1 + d to k do
ti;l =
Si;k¡Si;1
l¡1 ; 8i 2 N;
end do
step 4 t¤
i = maxl2f1+d;:::;kgfti;l : 9j 2 f1;:::;kgs.t. 2 Di;j > ti;lg 8i 2 N;
step 5 mi = minfj 2 f1;:::;kg : Di;j > t¤
ig; 8i 2 N;
step 3 : for j : 1 to k do






In Figure 3.6 the threshold selected by Algorithm 2 on the expressions of gene 1
in Example 10 is shown, together with the threshold selected via the application
of the algorithm in Shmulevich and Zhang (2002). Note that the `big jump'
selected by Algorithm 2 is four times the `big jump' selected by the algorithm
in Shmulevich and Zhang (2002). The parameter d has been settled to 1 (no
low-bound outliers have been detected).87



























Figure A.1: Real-valued expressions of gene 1 in Example 10 corresponding
to column index 1;:::;7 of Table 3.1 (continuous line) and sorted by value
(dotted line). The dashed horizontal straight line indicates the dichotomization
threshold selected by Algorithm 2 and the ¯lled (un¯lled) points correspond
to the samples where gene 1 is labelled with value 1 (0), according to such a
threshold. The continuous horizontal straight line indicates the dichotomization
threshold selected by the algorithm introduced in Shmulevich and Zhang (2002).88References
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